Naturhouse Health, S.A. (NTH.MC) - Deep Dive Research Report

Report Date: May 18, 2026 Exchange: BME (Bolsa de Madrid) Sector: Consumer Defensive - Nutrition & Dietetics

Note on "Earnings Calls": Naturhouse Health does not conduct traditional analyst conference calls with live Q&A. As a small-cap Spanish issuer, the company fulfils its communication obligations by filing semi-annual results PDF presentations with the CNMV (Spain's securities regulator), alongside the audited financial statements. The four most recent results presentations - treated throughout this report as the equivalent of earnings calls - are: (1) H1 2024 (filed October 1, 2024), (2) FY2024 (filed April 1, 2025), (3) H1 2025 (filed October 1, 2025), and (4) FY2025 (filed March 23-25, 2026). No transcript exists because no verbal presentation was given. All attributed management positions are drawn from the published presentations, the CNMV filings, and the Instituto de Analistas Lighthouse analyst notes that reconstruct management messaging from those documents.

Section 1: What the Company Does

Naturhouse is a Spanish franchise retailer that sells herbal supplements, dietary food products, and body care cosmetics through a network of small, professionally-staffed nutrition centres. Every centre is staffed by a qualified nutritionist or dietitian who offers free personalised dietary advice to customers - the advice itself does not cost anything, but the customer is expected to purchase Naturhouse's proprietary products to follow the programme. That coupling of free professional guidance with captive product sales is the central mechanism of the business.

Félix Revuelta founded the concept in 1992 in Vitoria, in the Basque Country, after decades in the nutrition and pharmaceutical industry through his Kiluva group, which he had built from 1986 onward. Revuelta identified something specific: in the early 1990s, personalised dietary advice was expensive and only accessible to affluent clients. Mass-market weight management was either medically driven (requiring a doctor referral) or essentially do-it-yourself (supermarket products with no guidance). Naturhouse's proposition was to democratise access to a nutritionist by embedding one in every high-street location and funding that professional service through product margins.

The first store opened in 1992 in Vitoria. By the mid-1990s the company had expanded across Spain. In 1997 it adopted the franchise model - at the time a deliberate decision to scale quickly without capital - giving Revuelta the ability to expand the network while keeping tight control over store locations, shop layout, product range, and brand identity. In 2000 the company entered Portugal, marking its first international step. Italy followed, and over the following decade Naturhouse became the dominant operator in the European dietetic franchise category, listing on the Madrid Stock Exchange in 2015.

The mechanics of a Naturhouse centre are simple but tightly choreographed. A customer walks in, is greeted by a trained nutritionist (or in some markets a dietitian working under one), is assessed on body composition and weight history, and is given a personalised eating plan at no charge. The nutritionist then recommends specific Naturhouse products - herbal teas, meal replacement biscuits, supplement capsules, anti-cellulite creams - to accelerate and support the programme. The customer buys those products and returns weekly or fortnightly for a follow-up check-in. The return visit is part of the proposition: consistency and accountability from a qualified professional, week after week, are positioned as the key difference from a supermarket diet product that sits unopened in a cupboard. Naturhouse claims a programme completion rate of approximately 99.7%, citing that only 0.3% of clients who start the Naturhouse Method do not complete a programme phase - though this figure reflects programme engagement rather than clinical weight-loss outcomes and should be read accordingly.

The business has been declining in volume since 2019, when it operated 2,188 centres and generated EUR 81.7 million in revenue. By 2025 it operated roughly 1,300 centres and generated approximately EUR 48 million in revenue - a 41% revenue contraction over six years. The cause is a combination of COVID-related network disruption (2020-2021), post-COVID consumer reorientation, and the longer-running headwind from digital and pharmaceutical alternatives to in-store diet programmes. The business nevertheless remains highly profitable: EBIT margins have held in the 26-28% range through the decline, because the franchise model is structurally asset-light and costs fall roughly in proportion with revenue when stores close.

Section 2: Business Segments

Naturhouse reports as a single operating segment - the sale of nutrition and dietetic products through its franchise network. It does not break out separate P&L reporting for supplements versus food versus cosmetics. However, the company organises its product portfolio around three meaningful commercial categories, and its geographic operations are sufficiently distinct that each major country deserves treatment as a sub-segment.

France

France is Naturhouse's largest single market, contributing approximately 36% of consolidated revenue. Naturhouse entered France relatively early in its international expansion and has built a substantial presence, operating several hundred centres across the country through a directly-managed subsidiary. France stands out as the one geography that grew in FY2025 (+1.3%) when all other core markets contracted. That resilience is attributed partly to the French market's cultural relationship with nutrition advice (pharmacist-adjacent services enjoy high credibility) and partly to Naturhouse's long-established brand recognition there. The French operation also launched the "NH Lib'" format - a lighter footprint adaptation of the standard Naturhouse centre designed for smaller towns - and continued opening new locations into 2025, with centres in Roanne and Lavaur opening in the early part of the year.

Italy

Italy is the second-largest market at approximately 29% of revenue. It was the first major international expansion beyond Iberia and at its peak housed over 500 Naturhouse centres. Italy is also the geography with the most recently troubled narrative: the FY2025 results showed a revenue decline of -7.8%, and the exit of Rafaello Pellegrini - the executive who literally built the Italian subsidiary from scratch over 12+ years and then served as General Director of the whole group - in March 2026 creates genuine uncertainty about near-term Italian management continuity. Pellegrini's departure followed an agreed resolution with the Italian subsidiary (Naturhouse SRL), suggesting the separation involved some form of negotiated settlement rather than a straightforward resignation.

Spain

Spain is both the company's founding market and its third-largest contributor by revenue at roughly 26%. In 2023 Spain had 321 centres; by 2024 that had fallen to 281, a loss of 40 locations in a single year. FY2025 saw revenue decline -6%. Spain is the market where Naturhouse has the most direct competitive exposure to GLP-1 prescription drugs and digital wellness apps, and where the brand is most mature - meaning the growth ceiling from new customer acquisition is lower than in markets where the Naturhouse Method is still relatively unfamiliar.

Poland

Poland is the company's most pressured market. At roughly 11% of revenue, it contributed a FY2025 decline of -8%, the steepest drop across all geographies. Poland's decline is linked to a combination of post-COVID consumer habits shifting away from structured diet programmes and the higher general price sensitivity in that market limiting ability to pass through cost increases.

Other Markets (Master Franchises)

Beyond the four directly-managed subsidiaries, Naturhouse operates through master franchise agreements in a further 27+ countries. In 2025 the company added Austria and Lithuania, bringing total country presence to 34 or more. These master franchise territories operate as independently managed networks: a local master franchisee pays for the right to develop the Naturhouse brand in their country, funds store rollout themselves, and buys products from Naturhouse. Revenue from these territories feeds into the consolidated figures but typically represents a smaller and less consistent contribution than the directly operated markets. Switzerland was entered in an earlier period. The UK, Canada, and Mexico are also present in this tier.

Section 3: Products and Business Detail

Product Categories

Food Supplements form the core and likely dominant revenue category. These are capsules, tablets, sachets, and herbal teas formulated with natural plant extracts designed to support weight management. Examples include fat burners, appetite modulators, diuretic formulations, and metabolic support blends. Products are made from natural plant ingredients - artichoke, fucus, spirulina, garcinia, green tea, and others - positioned as natural and non-pharmaceutical. The science base for most individual ingredients is limited, but the programme framework (caloric restriction + weekly monitoring) provides a measurable outcomes structure that individual supplements cannot claim independently.

Healthy Foods and Drinks are the second category: meal replacement biscuits, protein bars, breakfast substitutes, and snack products designed to be consumed as part of the daily eating plan. These function as convenient low-calorie options that fit within the prescribed programme and generate repeat purchase. Flavour and format innovation in this category has been part of the company's product development cadence.

Cosmetics and Body Care complete the range with anti-cellulite creams, firming lotions, and slimming serums sold as physical-results complements to the dietary programme. These typically carry high perceived value and healthy gross margins because the active-ingredient cosmetics segment commands pricing power.

Manufacturing

Naturhouse is vertically integrated in product development and manufacturing. The company produces its proprietary formulations in Spain, Poland, and Mexico. The Spanish operation is the primary manufacturing and formulation hub. Polish production serves the Central and Eastern European network; Mexican production serves Mexico and potentially broader LatAm master franchise territories. Naturhouse owns more than 200 SKUs across the three categories. Owning the formulation and production rather than white-labelling from contract manufacturers gives the company margin control and - importantly - the ability to prevent franchisees from sourcing competing products from third parties. The franchise contract requires franchisees to purchase all products exclusively from Naturhouse. This exclusivity is the mechanism by which the low annual royalty (EUR 696/year) still generates a viable business: the royalty is almost irrelevant; the value is in the guaranteed product flow.

The Franchise Contract Economics

The franchise entry cost of EUR 52,000 covers fitout, product opening stock, initial training, and setup support. The location requires 50 square meters in a city of at least 15,000 people, positioned in a high-traffic commercial zone. Importantly, the franchisee must be a qualified health professional (pharmacist, dietitian, nutritionist, biologist, nurse) or employ one full time - this professional requirement creates a meaningful barrier to opportunistic entry and maintains service quality. The five-year franchise term is renewable. Because the franchisee's primary cost after setup is the mandatory product purchase from Naturhouse, the company's revenue is essentially franchisee product reorder volume, not royalty income. A store doing modest client volumes still generates consistent product orders. This makes revenue highly predictable at the individual location level.

Geographic Expansion Architecture

The company's geographic architecture has three tiers. At the top are directly-managed subsidiaries in Spain, France, Italy, and Poland - here, Naturhouse owns the local operating company, employs (or contracts) the local management, signs up franchisees directly, and sells products to them. Revenue from these markets flows fully into consolidated accounts. In the second tier are countries where a single master franchisee has paid for exclusive rights to develop the Naturhouse network in their country - they recruit and manage local franchisees, buy products from Naturhouse in Spain at a wholesale price, and are responsible for their own territory's profitability. Naturhouse recognises these product sales as revenue. The third tier, very small, is limited direct-to-consumer e-commerce, which exists but is not a material contributor.

Section 4: Customers

Franchisees as Primary Customers

Despite what the consumer-facing proposition might suggest, Naturhouse's direct customers are its franchisees. The end consumer (the person trying to lose weight) pays money to the franchisee, not to Naturhouse. Naturhouse receives money from the franchisee in the form of mandatory product purchases. This is a B2B supply relationship dressed in a B2C brand.

The franchisee buying decision is made by a health professional entrepreneur weighing three things: the initial investment required (EUR 52,000), the expected return from product margin and client volumes, and the support infrastructure that Naturhouse provides. Naturhouse positions itself as an unusually low-overhead entry into independent health entrepreneurship - the professional equipment is the person's own qualifications, the fitout is modest, and the marketing is done centrally. The annual royalty of EUR 696 is almost symbolic; the real ongoing cost is product purchase at wholesale prices.

Once a franchisee has set up and built a client book, switching costs are material. They cannot replicate the product formulations independently, their client base has been acquired under the Naturhouse brand, and the network support (training, marketing materials, product innovation pipeline) is tied to the franchise relationship. A franchisee who defects loses their brand, their access to the product range, and the back-office support. Most franchisees who leave close rather than rebrand.

End Consumers

The end consumer is typically female, aged 30-65, seeking supervised weight management. The demographic skews toward women who have tried self-directed approaches and are seeking structured accountability, and toward consumers who prefer "natural" herbal alternatives over pharmaceutical interventions. The free professional advice element is the primary customer acquisition driver - it lowers the psychological barrier to entry compared with paying for a dietitian consultation upfront. The recurring return visit creates the retention mechanism.

Customer Concentration

Given the franchise model, no single franchisee represents material revenue concentration. The master franchise layer introduces some concentration risk in smaller international markets, but even losing a master franchisee in a smaller territory does not threaten the consolidated business.

Section 5: Competitive Landscape

Direct Category Competitors

The European dietetic and nutrition services market is fragmented at the local level but structured around a few recognisable category types. Naturhouse faces competition from:

Weight Watchers / WW International: A global brand with a points-based programme, online and in-person coaching, and no proprietary supplement sales. WW has moved heavily toward digital-first delivery, which reduces its physical footprint but broadens its reach. WW's model does not include herbal supplements and relies on community/peer accountability rather than professional nutritionist advice. The target customer overlaps but Naturhouse's "certified professional in every location" positions differently.

Slimming World (primarily UK): A group-based programme built around weekly meetings. Minimal presence in Naturhouse's core geographies of France, Italy, Spain, and Poland. Less of a direct threat in current markets.

Herbalife: Sells nutritional supplements through a multi-level marketing network rather than franchise. Present in Spain and Italy. A more direct product overlap with Naturhouse's supplement range, but the MLM model and lack of professional advice differentiates the offering.

Eladiet and Santiveri (Spain): Spanish herbal supplement brands sold through pharmacies and health food stores. These are product-only competitors without the advice component. Lower barriers to entry (just buying the product) but also lower engagement and compliance.

GLP-1 Prescription Drugs (Ozempic / Wegovy / Mounjaro): The most structurally threatening competitive force Naturhouse faces, and the one most explicitly flagged by the Instituto de Analistas. Semaglutide and tirzepatide are achieving clinically documented weight loss of 15-22% of body weight in trials and are being prescribed at scale across Europe. A patient on Ozempic does not need a weekly check-in at a Naturhouse centre. These drugs are prescription-only and expensive without insurance subsidy, which currently limits their reach to higher-income consumers - but reimbursement coverage is expanding in several European countries. The company has not publicly articulated a specific response strategy to GLP-1 adoption.

Digital Nutrition Apps: Noom, MyFitnessPal, Lifesum, and AI-assisted nutrition coaches offer a version of personalised tracking at zero or low cost. The digitally-native consumer cohort (under 35) is increasingly comfortable receiving dietary guidance via app rather than in-store. This does not displace Naturhouse's core demographic immediately, but it narrows the addressable market over time.

Competitive Strengths

Naturhouse's defensible position rests on three things that are genuinely hard to replicate at its scale:

The professional advice-product bundle: Competitors either offer products without professional advice (Herbalife, Eladiet) or advice without proprietary products (WW). The combination of both in a physically accessible high-street format is unique at Naturhouse's scale across Europe.
Manufacturing integration: Owning the formulations and production prevents any franchisee from substituting products and prevents competitors from replicating the full programme without significant investment.
The France brand franchise: In France specifically, where the brand has decades of presence and a network of hundreds of centres, the switching cost for the local franchise community and the customer recognition creates a durable incumbency advantage.

Competitive Weaknesses

The most serious vulnerability is that the entire model depends on customers perceiving value in weekly in-person check-ins at a physical location. That perception is structural-trend-negative: digital health, GLP-1 pharmacology, and changing consumer habits about professional consultations (post-COVID preference for remote) all work against it. The store count decline from 2,283 in 2018 to approximately 1,300 in 2024 is the quantified evidence that the addressable market for this specific format is contracting.

Section 6: Industry

Demand Drivers

Demand for weight management services in Europe is driven by two opposing forces pulling in different directions. On the demand side: rising obesity rates (over 50% of European adults are overweight or obese), increasing awareness of metabolic health consequences, and growing consumer spending on wellness. On the supply side: an explosion of alternatives ranging from pharmaceutical to digital that are competing for the same weight-loss consumer.

The European weight management market (products, services, and digital) has been estimated at approximately EUR 80-90 billion including associated healthcare costs, with the specific supplement and structured programme segment valued in the EUR 1-2 billion range across core Western European markets. Growth forecasts for the broader market are positive (industry analysts cite 5-9% CAGR through 2030-2033), but this growth is being captured almost entirely by pharmaceutical channels (GLP-1 drugs) and digital platforms. The specific physical-franchise-with-herbal-supplements sub-segment that Naturhouse occupies is contracting.

Industry Structure

Naturhouse occupies a niche within the European dietetic industry that sits between pharmacies (higher-margin, more medically credentialed) and mass-market health food stores (lower-margin, no advice). The franchise model maps onto a tradition of specialist health advice shops that has deep roots in France (parapharmacies, herboristes) and Spain (herbolarios) and less so in Northern Europe. This cultural substrate is why France and Southern Europe are stronger markets for the concept than the UK, Scandinavia, or Germany.

Regulatory Environment

Naturhouse's products are sold as food supplements and cosmetics, not as pharmaceuticals. This classification is critical: it means products are not subject to clinical efficacy requirements, but it also means they cannot make specific health claims (per EU Regulation 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims). The regulatory barrier to entry for producing herbal supplements is relatively low compared to pharmaceuticals. The professional staffing requirement at each franchise centre is a self-imposed quality standard rather than a regulatory mandate - most European countries do not require a dietitian at a nutrition supplement shop. This distinguishes Naturhouse and adds credibility but also adds operating cost relative to a non-staffed supplement retailer.

Cyclicality

Demand for weight management is mildly counter-cyclical: in economic downturns, consumers trade down from expensive gym memberships or medically supervised programmes toward lower-cost alternatives. However, discretionary wellness spending is the first item cut when household budgets are squeezed, which creates some economic sensitivity. The company's revenue decline in 2023-2025 appears primarily structural (GLP-1 competition, format fatigue) rather than cyclical.

Section 7: Growth Triggers

Sourced from the four results presentations: H1 2024 (October 1, 2024), FY2024 (April 1, 2025), H1 2025 (October 1, 2025), and FY2025 (March 23-25, 2026).

France as a proof-of-concept recovery market. France was the only core geography to grow in FY2025 (+1.3%) and was the least-impacted market in H1 2025 (-0.6% vs Spain -6.2% and Poland -6.4%). The FY2025 presentation positioned France's trajectory as demonstrating that the Naturhouse model can return to growth at the country level when the network is properly managed and supported. (FY2025 results presentation, March 2026; H1 2025 results presentation, October 2025)
New store openings using a company-owned test model before franchise transfer. Analyst notes covering both FY2024 and FY2025 presentations reference management's articulation of a strategy to open company-owned centres as pilots, which can later be transferred to franchisees once profitable. This represents a shift from the historical posture of purely organic franchisee-led growth and is positioned as the lever for reversing the multi-year store count decline. (FY2024 results presentation, April 2025; FY2025 results presentation, March 2026 - strategy repeated across both periods)
Geographic expansion into new territories. Naturhouse has added new master franchise countries in 2024-2025: Austria and Lithuania are the most recently confirmed entrants, bringing total country presence to 34. Switzerland, added slightly earlier, is also a relatively new market. Each new master franchise territory generates an upfront licensing fee and ongoing product revenue. (Naturhouse corporate announcements, supported by results presentation context)
Gross margin improvement as a self-funding growth driver. Gross margin expanded to 72.2% in FY2025 (+0.3pp vs FY2024) and reached 73% in H1 2025 (+1pp). Management highlighted this improvement as a structural achievement from product mix optimisation and manufacturing efficiencies, positioning it as a source of reinvestment capacity even while top-line revenue declined. (H1 2025 results presentation, October 2025; FY2025 results presentation, March 2026)
NH Lib' format expansion in France. The NH Lib' is a smaller-footprint adaptation of the standard Naturhouse centre designed for smaller towns and secondary locations in France. Openings continued in 2025 (Roanne and Lavaur confirmed). This format is specifically designed to penetrate markets where the full 50-square-metre standard store would not be viable, potentially widening the addressable French market. (Naturhouse corporate communications, 2025)

Section 8: Key Risks

1. GLP-1 Drug Competition - Structural, Medium-to-High Probability

The emergence of semaglutide (Ozempic/Wegovy, Novo Nordisk) and tirzepatide (Mounjaro/Zepbound, Eli Lilly) as clinically proven weight-loss drugs represents the most structurally serious risk to Naturhouse's business model. These drugs achieve 15-22% weight reduction - materially better than any herbal supplement or structured diet programme. They are prescription-only, expensive without reimbursement, and currently inaccessible to the median Naturhouse customer. But reimbursement is expanding across Europe: Spain's national health system is evaluating coverage; France's HAS has already approved Wegovy for limited reimbursement. The mechanism of harm for Naturhouse is straightforward: a consumer prescribed a GLP-1 drug does not need weekly nutritionist check-ins or herbal appetite suppressants. They simply take the injection. If reimbursement scale accelerates, the addressable market for supervised herbal supplement programmes could contract sharply.

2. Structural Store Count Decline - Ongoing, High Probability of Continuation

From 2,283 stores in 2018 to approximately 1,300 in 2024, the network has lost roughly 43% of its locations. In 2024, 105 franchised centres and 4 owned centres closed. The decline is driven by individual franchisees deciding not to renew, stores becoming unprofitable as client volumes decline, and reduced new franchisee recruitment as awareness of the revenue decline raises doubts about the franchise proposition. The feedback loop is problematic: fewer stores means lower brand visibility in any given city, which depresses new client flow, which makes existing stores less profitable, which triggers more closures. Management has articulated a response (opening own centres as pilots) but has not demonstrated the ability to halt the net decline yet.

3. Dividend Sustainability - Structural, Medium Probability in 2-3 Years

Naturhouse paid EUR 18 million in dividends during 2025 against net income of approximately EUR 10.1 million. This implies a payout ratio of approximately 178%. The funding source is the net cash position (EUR 19.5 million at end of 2024), which covers approximately one year of this excess payout. A dividend yield approaching 12% in the context of a declining revenue business is either a capital return story (the company has decided to return capital before the business shrinks further) or a dividend that will need to be cut when cash is depleted. Both interpretations carry risk: investors pricing in the high yield are exposed to a cut; the business depleting cash loses financial flexibility for the pilot centre strategy.

4. Management Instability and Governance - Elevated, Recent

In September 2025, the coordinating independent director José María Castellano Ríos - a former Vice Chairman/CEO of Inditex and the most credentialled external governance voice on the board - died. His board seat has not been disclosed as replaced. In March 2026, Rafaello Pellegrini resigned as General Director of both the Italian subsidiary and the group, after only three years in the role. He had been the architect of Italian growth, working in that market for 12+ years before his group promotion. His departure under an "agreed arrangement with the Italian subsidiary" (the language in the CNMV filing) implies a negotiated exit rather than a routine succession, and leaves the Italian leadership question open. Beyond these personnel events, in June 2024 the CNMV published a fine of EUR 110,000 against Chairman Félix Revuelta for using privileged information in the February 2020 sale of 1.1 million Sniace shares through Kiluva and Finverki. The transaction involved a different company, but the finding of a "very serious" violation by a regulator is a direct governance data point on the controlling shareholder's conduct.

5. Related-Party Transactions - Low-to-Medium Probability of Harm, Worth Monitoring

Kiluva, the Revuelta family holding company that owns 77.1% of Naturhouse, has multiple commercial relationships with Naturhouse. Brands were acquired from Kiluva at an historical cost of EUR 2.3 million (now fully amortised). The company has acknowledged related-party transactions in its filings. In a structure where the controlling shareholder is also the Chairman and CEO and accounts for the overwhelming majority of voting rights, the ability of minority shareholders to scrutinise or challenge related-party terms is limited. The independent director shortfall (as of late 2025, with Castellano Ríos's seat unfilled, the board may fall below the minimum recommended proportion of independent members) exacerbates this concern.

Section 9: Walk the Talk

Concall dates used: H1 2024 (October 1, 2024); FY2024 (April 1, 2025); H1 2025 (October 1, 2025); FY2025 (March 23-25, 2026).

Note: As described in the preamble, these are PDF results presentations, not verbal calls. Management "commitments" are derived from the positioning language in those presentations and the analyst notes that reconstruct management messaging from them. Direct verbatim quotes from management are not available in the public domain for this company.

H1 2024 (October 2024) - The first deterioration signal. The H1 2024 results presented declining revenue (-1.8%) combined with a significantly worse net income decline (-21%), driven by cost pressure compressing margins from 26% to 21%. The presentation positioned this as a temporary cost normalisation rather than a structural margin deterioration, with the implied message that the second half of 2024 would show improvement or at least stabilisation. Management framing at this stage was defensive: acknowledge the top-line trend, emphasise the inherent profitability of the franchise model, highlight net cash strength as a balance sheet buffer.

FY2024 (April 2025) - Partial delivery, margin remained under pressure. The FY2024 presentation confirmed revenue of EUR 49.4 million (-1.9% vs 2023). Net income fell further to EUR 9.86 million from EUR 11.29 million (-12.7%). The margin pressure the H1 presentation called temporary did not fully reverse in H2 2024: H2 2024 net income implied from the data was approximately EUR 4.0 million, roughly half of H1's EUR 5.83 million. At this point, the pattern of consecutive years of declining revenue and declining earnings was four years old (2022, 2023, 2024). Management acknowledged the persistence of the headwinds in Poland and Italy particularly, while pointing to France as the relative bright spot. The store count for Spain was disclosed as declining from 321 to 281. The pilot centre strategy (opening own stores for later transfer to franchisees) was articulated here as the growth recovery mechanism.

H1 2025 (October 2025) - Genuine margin turnaround, revenue headwinds continued. H1 2025 delivered the first meaningful positive surprise in the trajectory: revenue fell -5.8% (worse than H1 2024's -1.8%), yet net income grew +6.2% to EUR 6.19 million. Gross margin hit 73% (+1pp), and net margin improved to 23.5% from 20.8% in H1 2024. This is a significant inflection - the business was losing revenue faster than before but converting what remained into profit more efficiently. Management's messaging around cost discipline and product mix improvement appeared to be delivering. The France narrative was also strengthened: France's -0.6% decline was materially better than Spain's -6.2% and Poland's -6.4%.

FY2025 (March 2026) - Margin defence confirmed, revenue decline continued but moderated. The FY2025 presentation showed revenue at approximately EUR 48 million (-3.2% vs FY2024), EBIT of EUR 13.7 million essentially flat (-0.1%), and gross margin of 72.2% (+0.3pp). Net income was approximately EUR 10.1 million, essentially flat versus EUR 9.86 million in 2024. France was the only growing geography (+1.3%). Importantly, the General Director departure (Rafaello Pellegrini, March 20, 2026) was filed with CNMV simultaneously with the financial results - an unusual coincidence of timing that inevitably raises the question of whether the Italian results (-7.8%) and the departure are connected. The dividend was announced at EUR 0.30/share for 2025 distributions.

Pattern Assessment: Management credibility is mixed. The multi-year revenue decline was consistently described as the product of an "adverse environment" (a fair characterisation given GLP-1 drugs, COVID aftermath, and digital competition) but the specific promise that costs would be contained and margins would recover has been partially kept: the H1 2025 and FY2025 margin performance is genuinely better than what was feared after the H1 2024 earnings deterioration. However, management has not demonstrated the ability to halt store count decline or return the franchise network to growth. The pilot centre strategy has been articulated but no evidence of success in reversing network size has appeared in the financial results. The most credible part of management's track record over the four periods is margin management; the least credible is the optimism about franchise network recovery.

Section 10: Shareholder Friendliness Index

Naturhouse is a pronounced capital returner. The company's stated policy is to distribute at least 85% of consolidated net profit as dividends, but actual distributions have significantly exceeded net income in recent years. During calendar 2022, EUR 0.30 per share gross (approximately EUR 18 million) was paid to shareholders against net income of EUR 9.6 million - a payout ratio approaching 188%. In 2023 the dividend was cut to EUR 0.10 per share (EUR 6 million), which was below the company's net income of EUR 11.3 million and represented a 67% dividend reduction - the most significant cut in recent years. The cut may have been a decision to preserve net cash after its sharp decline from EUR 25 million (2021) to EUR 10 million (2022). The dividend was then raised to EUR 0.20/share (EUR 12 million) in 2024 and EUR 0.30/share (EUR 18 million) in 2025. December 2025 brought an additional special distribution of EUR 0.10/share (EUR 6 million from free reserves, paid February 2026), taking total distributions attributable to or paid in 2025-2026 even higher relative to underlying earnings. The five-year DPS growth rate is reportedly 17.75% on a three-year compound basis, though this figure is distorted by the 2023 trough.

No buyback programme has been evidenced in the research for this report. Share count has been stable at approximately 59.9-60 million shares over the period reviewed. There is no meaningful dilution from equity compensation, consistent with the family-controlled, owner-operator structure.

Verdict: Returns Capital - aggressively so, with dividends consistently exceeding net income and being partially funded from reserves and balance sheet cash, which creates a sustainability question as net cash is gradually consumed.

Section 11: Insider Activities

Source: CNMV "Información Privilegiada" and "Otra Información Relevante" registers (cnmv.es), supplemented by Spanish financial press and CNMV enforcement publications.

Structure of ownership: Félix Revuelta (Chairman and CEO) controls approximately 77.1% of Naturhouse through his family holding company Kiluva, S.A. and associated entities. The public float is approximately 22.9%. Given this extreme ownership concentration, any registered insider transaction is almost definitionally Kiluva-related.

Transactions in Last 12 Months (May 2025 - May 2026)

The CNMV privileged information register as accessed during this research returned data through only 2021 for Naturhouse specifically, suggesting recent PDMR disclosures for Naturhouse are either filed under the standard regulatory filings register or were not indexed in the version of the portal accessed. Direct access to the CNMV "Comunicaciones de directivos" insider transaction database for Naturhouse in the MAR Article 19 notification form did not yield discrete transaction records for the May 2025 to May 2026 period within the search budget for this report.

From searches of Spanish financial media for the same period, the following material items were identified:

Date	Insider (Name & Role)	Type	Notes
Mar 20, 2026	Rafaello Pellegrini, General Director	Departure	Negotiated exit per CNMV filing (Reg. 39818)
Sep 29, 2025	José María Castellano Ríos, Independent Director	Death	Board restructured following passing (Reg. 36889)
Jun 2024	Félix Revuelta, Chairman	Regulatory fine	EUR 110,000 CNMV fine for 2020 Sniace insider trading

No open-market share purchases or sales by Naturhouse insiders specifically were confirmed in the publicly accessible sources for the May 2025 to May 2026 window. Given that Kiluva holds 77.1% and the primary economic interest of the Revuelta family is expressed through dividend income rather than share trading, the absence of open-market transactions is not surprising.

The CNMV fine against Félix Revuelta, while related to Sniace and not Naturhouse shares, is a material governance data point. The CNMV characterised the 2020 Sniace transactions as a "very serious" violation involving the sale of 1.1 million Sniace shares using inside knowledge of a contract termination that was announced to the market on the same day as the trades. The fine of EUR 110,000 is at the low end of Spanish regulatory sanctions for this category of violation, and Revuelta has the right to challenge the resolution in the National Court.

Net assessment: Neutral to mild concern. There are no open-market buys or sells of Naturhouse shares by insiders in the period reviewed, which tells us little directionally. The governance signals (CNMV fine, General Director departure, independent director death, related-party transactions with Kiluva) collectively represent a governance environment that is less reassuring than a company with robust independent board oversight. The high ownership concentration means minority shareholder interests are entirely dependent on the controlling shareholder acting in alignment with the full shareholder register.

Note: CNMV insider transaction data for Naturhouse Health, S.A. in the specific PDMR notification register was not fully accessible for the 12-month review period. The CNMV portal returned data through 2021 for the privileged information category searched. The items above are sourced from the CNMV "Otra Información Relevante" register and Spanish financial press.

Section 12: Scenarios

Bull Case

In the bull case, France turns out to be not an exception but a template. Naturhouse's French management team has cracked a version of the store model - whether through the NH Lib' smaller format, through local marketing intensity, or through a particular approach to franchisee recruitment and retention - that can be exported back to Spain, Italy, and Poland. The pilot centre strategy gains traction: the company opens 30-40 owned centres per year in the weak markets, builds a profitable client base, then transfers them to franchisees with a proven track record, restarting the network growth engine for the first time since 2019. Meanwhile, GLP-1 drug affordability remains limited in Southern Europe (prescriptions remain out-of-pocket for most Naturhouse customers), meaning the company retains its addressable market. Margins hold above 25% EBIT and the business generates enough free cash to sustain meaningful dividend payments while slowly growing the network again. New master franchise territories (Austria, Lithuania, and further Eastern European markets) add a revenue layer. The Revuelta family, with >77% of the stock, is economically incentivised to maximise distributions and would benefit from a business recovery far more than from a restructuring.

Base Case

Revenue continues to decline at roughly 3-5% per year for the next two to three years, driven by ongoing store count attrition (particularly in Italy and Poland) that the pilot centre strategy partially offsets but does not reverse. France remains stable to slightly positive and becomes an increasingly large share of the revenue mix. EBIT margins stay in the 26-28% range through cost discipline. Net income hovers around EUR 9-11 million annually. The company continues to pay dividends roughly matching or slightly exceeding its net income, with net cash declining gradually. The Pellegrini departure creates some Italian turbulence but the market's structural economics (it was the second largest market) mean a new management team eventually stabilises it. The store count stabilises somewhere in the 1,100-1,200 range. GLP-1 drug access in Southern Europe remains a slow-burn competitive pressure rather than an acute disruption within this timeframe.

Bear Case

The bear case has two accelerants. First, reimbursement for GLP-1 drugs (Wegovy or an equivalent) is approved in France or Spain for obesity treatment without significant co-pay requirements. This opens the drug to the mass-market consumer who currently uses Naturhouse, collapsing demand in the company's two largest markets. Second, the Italian market deteriorates sharply following Pellegrini's departure: the new management lacks his operational relationships with Italian franchisees, a cohort of key operators decides not to renew, and Italy goes from -7.8% to double-digit annual decline. In this scenario, the company is losing revenue faster than it can cut costs, margins compress, and the net cash position that has been funding excess dividends is deployed defensively rather than returned to shareholders. The dividend is cut materially - potentially by 50% or more - which removes the primary reason most investors own the stock. The share price, which is heavily supported by the dividend yield, de-rates. The company enters a prolonged but probably not existential decline: the franchise model remains asset-light enough that it can survive at a much smaller scale, but the investment thesis built on a double-digit yield would be fundamentally broken.

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