Straumann Holding AG (STMN.SW) - Deep Dive Research Report

Research date: 23 May 2026 Concalls covered: H1/Q2 2025 (13 Aug 2025) | Q3 2025 (29 Oct 2025) | FY2025 (18 Feb 2026) | Q1 2026 (29 Apr 2026)

Section 1: What the Company Does

Straumann makes the components a dentist implants into your jaw to replace a missing tooth. That is the simplest version. The complete version is more interesting.

When a tooth is lost - to decay, trauma, or gum disease - the options are a denture, a bridge, or an implant. Implants are the only permanent, biologically integrated solution. A titanium fixture, slightly smaller than the tooth root it replaces, is drilled into the jawbone. Over three to six weeks the bone grows into the fixture's textured surface - a process called osseointegration. An abutment screws onto the exposed tip. A custom porcelain crown attaches to the abutment. Done correctly, the result is indistinguishable from a natural tooth and lasts a lifetime.

The performance of the implant depends enormously on the quality of the fixture's surface, the alloy it is made from, the precision of the surgical instruments, and the clinical protocol surrounding placement. Straumann, over seven decades, has built the world's most documented implant system - more peer-reviewed clinical evidence than any competitor, a proprietary surface technology (SLActive) that accelerates bone attachment, and an alloy (Roxolid, titanium-zirconium) that is stronger than pure titanium, allowing narrower implants in anatomically challenging sites.

But Straumann in 2026 is no longer just a fixture manufacturer. Through acquisitions across fifteen years, it has assembled a portfolio that covers the full treatment continuum: the implant, the prosthetic crown, the digital scanner that captures the patient's anatomy, the CAD/CAM software that designs the crown, the 3D printer that produces the restoration chairside, the clear aligner that straightens teeth before or instead of implants, and the AI platform that monitors orthodontic treatment remotely. The unifying logic is that every touchpoint in a dentist's workflow where Straumann is present is a relationship, a data point, and a switching cost.

The founding story runs through the company's DNA in an unusually literal way. Dr. Reinhard Straumann established a materials research institute in Waldenburg, Switzerland in 1954, initially focused on metal alloys for the watchmaking industry and for bone fracture fixation. His son Fritz Straumann recognized in the 1970s that the same titanium and zirconium alloys the family was developing for orthopedic fixation had transformative applications in dentistry, where the field had recently discovered that titanium bonds permanently to living bone. In 1990, a management buyout separated the orthopedic business (which eventually became Synthes, later sold to Johnson & Johnson for $21.3B). The dental business kept the Straumann name, operated from Basel with 25 employees, and went public on the SIX Swiss Exchange in 1998. Thomas Straumann, Reinhard's grandson, served as Chairman for twelve years until stepping down to Honorary Chairman in March 2026 - handing leadership of a company his grandfather built to a professional management team while retaining strong family ownership.

The core value proposition is clinical certainty. An oral surgeon placing a Straumann implant can point a patient to over 100 clinical studies on the SLActive surface alone, to a 10-year implant survival rate approaching 98-99%, and to more than 30 years of accumulated post-market data. This evidence base is not a marketing construct - it is the accumulated output of Straumann's investment in clinical research and its network of academic partnerships. Dentists placing implants in systemically compromised patients (controlled diabetics, smokers, those with a history of periodontitis) specifically choose Straumann because the evidence for those high-risk cases is strongest.

A typical treatment experience: a patient presents to an oral surgeon with a missing molar. The surgeon takes a CBCT scan, imports it into the AXS planning software, designs the implant position digitally, and orders a surgical guide from the Straumann lab. On treatment day, the guide ensures precision placement. The Straumann BLX or BLC fixture (part of the iEXCEL system) is placed. The SLActive surface begins bonding to bone within days. At the three-to-four week healing check, the patient has a digital scan taken with the SIRIOS intraoral scanner. The scan feeds into the design center, which mills or 3D prints a custom abutment and crown. Total chair time across two visits: under two hours. The patient leaves with a functional, natural-looking tooth built on an evidence base the surgeon can defend in front of any peer or payer.

Section 2: Business Segments

Straumann operates across three pillars that the company crystallized at its Capital Markets Day in November 2025: Implantology, Orthodontics, and Digital Technologies / Prosthetics. The pillars are not the same as its legal segments, but they represent how management allocates investment and how revenue is increasingly understood by the market.

Implantology

Implantology is the core engine - it generates the majority of group revenue and funds the investment in the other two pillars. The business within implantology runs a multi-tier brand strategy that took fifteen years to fully construct.

At the premium tier sits the Straumann brand itself. The clinical heritage, the SLActive and Roxolid proprietary technologies, the dense clinical evidence network, and the professional education platform all attach to this brand. The Straumann-branded system targets specialists - periodontists, oral surgeons, prosthodontists - and increasingly well-trained general practitioners who operate in markets where clinical credentialing is part of how a practice competes. The launch of the iEXCEL system in 2024 and the subsequent full global launch at IDS 2025 (the world's largest dental trade show) has been the central commercial event of recent years. iEXCEL consolidates four implant designs (BLX, BLC, TL, TLA) onto a single prosthetic connection platform, meaning that a dentist trained on iEXCEL can handle nearly any clinical indication without changing instrument kits or prosthetic components. By Q1 2026, iEXCEL had exceeded one million units placed and represented over 20% of premium implant volume. The BLC design - the newest addition, a tapered implant for challenging bone situations - drew 25% of its initial customers from competing brands, which is an unusually strong cross-over signal.

At the challenger tier sits Neodent, acquired from Brazil in 2012, and Anthogyr, a French company acquired in 2019. Neodent is Straumann Group's largest challenger brand globally, with its Aqua and Helix implant systems offering comparable clinical outcomes to premium systems at 20-40% lower price points. Neodent was built for Brazil's private market and expanded into Mexico, Colombia, and LatAm broadly. It has now established a meaningful presence in EMEA and is entering Asian markets. Anthogyr's Axiom system is the challenger of choice in France and extends through French-speaking Europe and into Asia. Medentika, a German brand acquired in 2016, plays a specialized role: it manufactures prosthetic components compatible with multiple competing implant systems (Nobel Biocare, Dentsply Sirona, and others), giving Straumann Group an aftermarket revenue stream on competitors' installed base - a structurally intelligent position. maxon dental, acquired to full ownership in 2025, makes the world's first two-piece ceramic implant system, addressing the growing minority of patients who request metal-free options.

The implantology segment's competitive capability rests on three things that took decades to build: the evidence base, the education network (10,700+ programs per year, 370,000+ professionals trained), and the manufacturing precision at Villeret, Switzerland, where implant tolerances are measured in microns. The Villeret site is receiving CHF 60-80 million in investment over 2025-2030 to expand capacity. A new Shanghai campus inaugurated in September 2025 adds a second major manufacturing site for the first time, with significance for China's regulatory environment (detailed in Section 7).

The implantology segment is the group's margin engine. Pricing power is high at the premium tier, clinical trials act as a structural barrier to entry, and the installed base of prosthetic connections creates ongoing consumable revenue throughout each implant's lifetime.

Orthodontics (ClearCorrect)

ClearCorrect was acquired from its US founder in 2018 for roughly $1 billion - Straumann's largest acquisition at the time. Clear aligners (often called Invisalign generically, after Align Technology's dominant brand) are thin, removable plastic trays that gradually move teeth. A dentist takes a digital scan of the patient's mouth, uploads it, and receives a series of custom-designed trays that the patient wears day and night, switching every one to two weeks over six to twelve months.

The commercial logic was sound: Straumann had deep relationships with dentists, and orthodontics was a large, fast-growing market where those relationships could be leveraged. The execution has been harder. Align Technology's Invisalign has a deeply entrenched position - decades of clinical data, the iTero intraoral scanner that creates platform lock-in, a dense orthodontist network, and manufacturing at scale in Juárez, Mexico. ClearCorrect competes as the value alternative and has found its strongest traction with general practitioners (GPs) and dental service organizations (DSOs) rather than orthodontists.

The 2025 orthodontics transformation, announced in Q3 2025, was an honest acknowledgment of what was working and what was not. Straumann announced a partnership with Smartee - a Chinese company with 20+ years of orthodontic manufacturing expertise - to take over ClearCorrect aligner manufacturing for EMEA and Asia-Pacific. The Markkleeberg, Germany manufacturing plant is closing by early 2026. Straumann retains a single-digit stake in Smartee, securing a long-term manufacturing relationship at lower cost. Separately, Straumann deepened its partnership with DentalMonitoring (in which it holds a minority stake since 2018), creating "ClearCorrect RemoteCare" - AI-powered remote monitoring integrated into the ClearCorrect platform. The product was piloted at end of 2025 with global rollout planned for 2026. Remote monitoring is a genuine differentiator: patients who know their treatment progress is being supervised remotely show better compliance, and orthodontists who can monitor multiple patients simultaneously can scale their practices without proportionally more chair time.

The commercial focus is sharpening around GPs and DSOs, which are Straumann's home territory. The DSO channel in the US (Aspen Dental, Heartland, Pacific Dental) is growing faster than the traditional orthodontist channel and is more receptive to value-positioned alternatives to Invisalign. Expanding the ClearCorrect product bundle beyond aligners to include the SIRIOS scanner and digital workflow tools creates a more compelling integrated pitch.

Orthodontics is currently a subscale segment in the group's portfolio - contributing perhaps 10-15% of revenue - and it has been a margin drag as the company has restructured. The thesis is that it becomes a high-growth, self-sustaining business by 2027-2028 as the Smartee and DentalMonitoring partnerships take hold, while requiring lower fixed-cost investment once the manufacturing transition is complete.

Digital Technologies and Prosthetics

The digital segment is the newest and, by management's telling at CMD 2025, the segment with the greatest untapped opportunity. The global prosthetics market is estimated at CHF 6 billion and is largely still manual - dentists rely on human dental technicians to fabricate crowns, bridges, and full-arch prosthetics. Digitizing this workflow (scan → design → print/mill) eliminates several steps, reduces errors, and enables chairside production that eliminates lab turnaround delays.

Straumann's position in digital:

• SIRIOS intraoral scanner: Launched in 2024, the SIRIOS captures the patient's anatomy with a handheld device. The SIRIOS X3, launched in 2025, brings the technology into the mid-price segment. Both integrate with the AXS platform. The SIRIOS competes with 3Shape TRIOS, Align iTero, Medit, and Dentsply Sirona Primescan.
• MIDAS 3D printer: Launched June 2025, the MIDAS enables chairside production of resin restorations. The co-development with SprintRay (a specialist resin 3D printing company) allowed rapid time-to-market.
• Straumann AXS: Cloud platform launched 2025. Connects the SIRIOS scanner, the AXS treatment planning software, the AXS design center, and partner laboratories into "one connected environment." This is the ecosystem play - get enough touchpoints on the AXS platform and the relationship with the practice becomes stickier.
• CADCAM milling centers: Straumann operates centralized milling facilities in Germany, Japan, Canada, and elsewhere, producing crown and bridge prosthetics from digital files sent by dental practices.
• UN!Q: An AI-accelerated digital design tool launched to speed custom prosthetic design.

The segment's competitive edge is integration depth: the AXS platform works seamlessly with Straumann implants, which is a natural competitive advantage. When a dentist places an iEXCEL implant, the prosthetic restoration design process is far smoother through AXS than through a competitor's software, because the implant geometry, the healing cap, and the abutment connection are all known to the platform. This integration is what Straumann means when it talks about an "end-to-end workflow."

Section 3: Products and Business Detail

The implant fixture is Straumann's original product and still the most critical. Manufacturing an implant is far more technically demanding than it appears: the fixture must be machined to tolerances of a few microns, the surface must be treated to precise roughness parameters (optimized through decades of clinical research), the alloy chemistry must be controlled within narrow bands, and each batch must be sterile and traceable. Straumann's Villeret plant in the Swiss Jura has been optimizing this process since the 1960s. The SLActive surface is achieved through sandblasting (creating macro roughness), acid-etching (creating micro roughness), and then treating the surface to make it superhydrophilic - meaning it is instantly wetted by blood on contact rather than repelling it. This dramatically accelerates the fibrin clot formation that initiates bone attachment, reducing the critical osseointegration window from 6-8 weeks (standard SLA) to 3-4 weeks (SLActive). The clinical significance: faster loading (placing the crown earlier) and better outcomes in patients with systemic conditions that compromise healing.

The Roxolid alloy (approximately 13% zirconium balance titanium) was developed specifically by Straumann and provides materially higher fatigue resistance and ultimate tensile strength compared to commercially pure titanium grade 4. The practical benefit: implants with diameters as narrow as 3.3mm - replacing the 4.1mm that was previously the minimum - can be placed in sites where bone width is insufficient for a standard-diameter fixture. This opens indications that previously required bone augmentation surgery or a different prosthetic solution.

iEXCEL system in detail: The system launched globally in 2024-2025 consolidates what were previously separate product lines:

• BLX (Bone Level X-Line): The workhorse for healed bone sites. Tapered body for good initial stability. External connection with SLActive surface.
• BLC (Bone Level C-Line): Launched as part of iEXCEL. Slimmer apex for difficult bone situations. Tapered internal connection. Designed to compete directly with the Straumann BLT (Bone Level Tapered) and with competitors like Nobel Biocare's NobelActive.
• TL (Tissue Level): For cases where a tissue-level approach is preferred, keeping the implant-crown junction supragingival.
• TLA (Tissue Level Anatomical): For narrow sites.

All four connect to a single prosthetic platform, meaning a lab or practice with iEXCEL workflows doesn't need to stock separate prosthetic components for each implant design. This simplification has been explicitly cited by management as a driver of adoption.

Neodent's Aqua implant: The Aqua uses a helix design that provides excellent initial stability (torque on insertion) even in soft bone, making it well-suited for the broader clinical spectrum of a general practice environment. Manufactured in Curitiba, Brazil, the cost base is significantly lower than Villeret, enabling the lower selling price. Neodent's "connection" design (S-Curve prosthetics) is independent of the Straumann premium connection, which is intentional - the two brands do not share prosthetics, maintaining distinct product lines and customer relationships.

Digital product chain: The SIRIOS scanner at the start of the workflow captures full-arch digital impressions in minutes, replacing the notoriously uncomfortable physical impression trays that patients dread. The scan file goes to AXS, where AI algorithms help design the restoration. The file can be sent to a Straumann CADCAM center (which mills from zirconia or PMMA), or the practice can print a temporary restoration on the MIDAS printer chairside. The MIDAS prints in resin and is specifically positioned for temporary crowns and immediate loading cases where the patient needs something in place on the same day as implant surgery.

ClearCorrect aligner manufacturing: Until late 2025, ClearCorrect produced aligners at its Round Rock, Texas (US) plant and at Markkleeberg, Germany (EMEA/APAC). The Smartee partnership shifts EMEA/APAC production to Smartee's Chinese facilities, which bring cost efficiency and scale. The Markkleeberg plant closes. The US operation continues from Texas. Planning centers in Poland and Costa Rica support case review and treatment planning at lower labor cost than US operations.

Manufacturing geography:

• Villeret, Switzerland: Premium implant precision manufacturing. The historical heartland. Receiving major new investment.
• Andover, Massachusetts, US: Straumann Group US manufacturing hub.
• Round Rock, Texas, US: ClearCorrect aligner manufacturing.
• Curitiba, Brazil: Neodent. Supplying LatAm and, via export, parts of EMEA/APAC. Subject to tariff risk on US exports (see Section 8).
• Malmö, Sweden: European manufacturing for Medentika and challenger brands.
• Montreal, Canada: CADCAM prosthetics production.
• Shanghai, China: New campus inaugurated September 2025. Implant manufacturing for the Chinese market (Straumann and Anthogyr brands). Critical for VBP 2.0 positioning. Education center co-located.
• Kenzingen, Germany (maxon dental): Ceramic implant production.
• Medentika facilities in Germany: Expanding by 9,000 square meters in 2025.

Geographic revenue mix (FY2025):

• EMEA: ~42%
• North America: ~26%
• Asia-Pacific: ~23%
• Latin America: ~9%

Section 4: Customers

The purchasing decision for a dental implant flows from the clinician, not the patient. A patient who needs an implant does not choose between Straumann and Nobel Biocare - the oral surgeon or dentist makes that choice, typically based on the system they were trained on, the clinical evidence they trust, and the workflow that fits their practice. This makes the buying dynamic more analogous to pharmaceutical prescribing than to most consumer product markets.

Who buys: The primary customers are dental professionals across a spectrum:

• Oral surgeons and periodontists (specialists): The historical core customer for Straumann premium. These practitioners typically have the deepest implant volume, the strongest brand preferences, and the most demanding clinical requirements. They are reached primarily through Straumann's own sales force and through the education network (advanced surgical courses, cadaver workshops, ITI - International Team for Implantology - membership and scientific conferences).
• General dental practitioners with implant training: The fastest-growing segment. GP dentists historically referred implant cases to specialists, but improved surgical guidance systems and education programs have enabled competent GPs to handle straightforward cases in-house. Straumann has invested heavily in this segment (its GP training programs, DSO partnerships) and it is where ClearCorrect and the challenger brands find their primary audience.
• Dental Service Organizations (DSOs): Large dental chains that standardize product procurement across their practice network. In the US, companies like Aspen Dental (~1,000 locations), Heartland Dental (~2,500 locations), and Pacific Dental have enormous purchasing leverage. Straumann has a dedicated DSO department and positions itself as a strategic partner offering the premium brand, digital workflow capability, and challenger brands at different price points under one roof - a unique advantage since competitors typically have only one or two brand tiers.
• Dental laboratories: Buy prosthetic components (abutments, impression components, screws) that connect to the implant. Also buy digital software and CADCAM services. The Medentika brand specifically targets laboratories looking for compatible components for multiple implant systems.

Switching costs and lock-in: Once a dentist has placed 500 Straumann implants in patients over 10 years, every one of those patients will return for prosthetic maintenance, implant complications, or new adjacent implants throughout their lifetime. That installed base generates ongoing prosthetic revenue - and the patient trusts the dentist who treated them, reinforcing the dentist's continuation with the same brand. If the dentist switched to a competitor, they would need to stock both implant systems for their existing patient base, creating operational complexity. They would also need to retrain on the new system's instruments and surgical protocol, typically requiring a course and a period of supervised cases. The physical investment in instrument cassettes and surgical kits (typically CHF 2,000-10,000 per kit) is a smaller but real switching cost.

Digital integration deepens the lock-in substantially: a practice on the Straumann AXS platform with a SIRIOS scanner has investment in hardware, staff training, and workflow integration that would take 6-12 months to replicate with a competitor's system.

Contract structure: Most implantology sales are transactional - practices order as they treat patients, typically through a direct sales representative visit or an online portal. There are no long-term supply contracts in the traditional sense. For DSOs, Straumann negotiates volume commitments and rebate structures, which function as informal exclusivity without a binding contract. Clinical exclusivity (a DSO committing to use only Straumann products across all its locations) is rare and hard to enforce, but commercial relationships built over years create meaningful stickiness.

Customer concentration: No single customer represents a material share of group revenue - the customer base is tens of thousands of dental professionals across more than 100 countries. The closest to concentration risk is the DSO channel in the US, where a handful of large organizations have growing share of US dental procedure volume. Losing a major DSO contract would be commercially meaningful but not business-threatening.

Section 5: Competitive Landscape

The global dental implant market has a fairly clear four-tier structure.

Tier 1 - Premium: Straumann and Nobel Biocare (Envista). These brands compete for the specialist's trust and command the highest prices. Straumann has approximately 35% global market share, and Nobel Biocare (part of Envista Holdings, NYSE: NVST) holds approximately 20-25%. The gap between them has widened over the past five years as Nobel Biocare has struggled with parent-company strategic drift (Envista has been reviewing strategic alternatives for its dental business since 2025) and as Straumann has accelerated with iEXCEL and digital workflow investment.

Nobel Biocare has genuine strengths: the original All-on-4 full-arch protocol was pioneered by Nobel, the NobelActive implant is clinically excellent, and the All-on-4 franchise is deeply embedded in the edentulous rehabilitation market. But Envista's corporate complexity and the uncertainty around Nobel Biocare's ownership future are distractions. Management bandwidth at the brand level has been split between restructuring and execution. Straumann has been pulling ahead in digital capability and in the multi-tier brand architecture.

Tier 2 - Value European/Global: Dentsply Sirona (NASDAQ: XRAY), ZimVie, Henry Schein (via BioHorizons Camlog). Dentsply's implant brands (Ankylos, Xive, and the legacy Astra Tech) have strong positions in Northern Europe but weaker global distribution than Straumann. Dentsply's more interesting competitive dimension is in digital dentistry, where its CEREC in-practice milling system has 35+ years of installed base in dental practices. A dentist with a CEREC is already committed to Dentsply's digital ecosystem, and Dentsply's DAT software competes directly with the Straumann AXS platform. However, Dentsply has been under significant financial and strategic pressure - its Q1 2025 announcement of a strategic review of the entire implant business suggests the company may exit or restructure, which would be a removal of a competitor from Straumann's most directly contested segment.

Henry Schein's 2023 acquisition of BioHorizons and Camlog (creating a combined dental distribution + implant manufacturing play) is interesting but still integrating. BioHorizons has a strong US presence among GPs; Camlog is well-positioned in Germany and Switzerland. The combination gives Henry Schein a reason to push these brands through its distribution network, but it lacks the clinical research infrastructure and global education network that Straumann has built.

Tier 3 - Asian challengers: Osstem Implant (Korean, listed on KOSPI) and Dentium are the two largest. Osstem is enormous in South Korea (near-monopoly domestically), has strong presence throughout Southeast Asia and China, and is actively expanding in EMEA and the Americas. Osstem competes on price (30-50% below Straumann), reasonable clinical evidence, and very strong relationships in Asian hospital dental departments. Its competitive threat is greatest in price-sensitive markets and in the mid-tier of practice volume. Dentium follows a similar strategy, with slightly less global reach.

The key competitive dynamic: Asian manufacturers are gaining share in markets where Neodent or Anthogyr also compete (the challenger tier). This puts the middle of the market under pressure. Straumann's response has been to invest in making Neodent more globally competitive (expanding Curitiba manufacturing, entering new EMEA markets) while differentiating premium Straumann through innovation and education that Osstem cannot replicate.

Tier 4 - Local manufacturers: In China, a cohort of local dental manufacturers (Wego, Osstem China, various smaller players) has emerged following VBP 1.0. These companies compete in public hospital tenders where price is the primary criterion post-VBP. Their quality is improving. The VBP regulatory environment may deliberately favor them (see Section 7 and Section 8).

Barriers to entry: Building a credible dental implant business from scratch would require: 10-15 years of clinical trial data (regulators require multi-year follow-up for Class III devices), a manufacturing facility capable of micron-level precision machining at scale, a global regulatory clearance portfolio across 100+ markets (each country requires separate registration, some requiring local clinical trials), an education infrastructure to train dentists (because an implant company's products are only as good as the clinician using them), and a direct or distribution-based sales force able to visit and support dental practices. The total time and capital barrier is genuinely high. Even well-capitalized entrants (Korean manufacturers, Chinese state-supported firms) have taken 15-20 years to reach global credibility. The more probable competitive threat is from existing players gaining share, not from new entrants.

The most vulnerable flank is digital: software and AI companies could disrupt the workflow layer without needing a manufacturing moat. An imaging company that owns the scan-to-design workflow could in theory make the implant brand commoditized within its ecosystem. Straumann's response - building AXS as a proprietary but open platform, and ensuring SIRIOS and MIDAS are competitive hardware - is the right strategic response, but digital competition is faster-moving than implant competition.

Section 6: Industry

What drives demand: The primary demand driver is simple: 220 million people globally are estimated to need implants, but only approximately 16 million are treated annually (per Straumann's CMD 2025). The penetration rate is, depending on market, 3-15% of the addressable population. This is not a mature market facing saturation - it is a chronically underpenetrated market where the barriers to treatment are cost, awareness, and access to qualified clinicians.

In developed markets (Western Europe, North America), the demand drivers are:

• Aging demographics: tooth loss is correlated with age, and the over-65 population in Europe and North America continues growing
• Rising dental awareness and aesthetics: patients increasingly expect a permanent, natural-looking solution rather than a removable denture
• DSO expansion: dental chains are growing their implant service offerings, bringing implant treatment to practices that previously referred cases out

In emerging markets (China, India, Southeast Asia, LatAm):

• Rising middle class with disposable income for out-of-pocket healthcare
• Urbanization and access to qualified dental professionals
• Government healthcare initiatives (China's VBP, while a short-term disruption, reflects the government's acknowledgment of the market's scale and the importance of making implants more accessible)

Industry size: The global dental implants and prosthetics market was estimated at approximately USD 12.6 billion in 2025, projected to grow to approximately USD 17.7 billion by 2031, representing a ~6.7% compound annual growth rate (MarketsandMarkets). Dental implants specifically (excluding prosthetics and digital) were approximately USD 7.8-10.5 billion in 2025 depending on scope definition (Knowledge Sourcing, Grand View Research). The orthodontic aligner market adds a further CHF 4.7 billion, and the prosthetics/CADCAM segment is estimated at CHF 6 billion - giving Straumann Group an addressable market well above CHF 20 billion against its current revenue scale.

Regulatory environment: Dental implants are regulated as Class IIb medical devices in the EU (CE marking under MDR, the Medical Device Regulation enacted fully in 2021, with stricter clinical evidence requirements than the predecessor MDD) and as Class III devices in the US (requiring FDA Premarket Approval, a multi-year process). China's NMPA approval process has become more stringent and is now linked to the country's local manufacturing preference policies. The Swiss Swissmedic regulates domestic production.

The most consequential current regulatory development is China's Volume-Based Procurement (VBP). VBP 1.0, implemented in 2023, forced participating companies to cut prices by 50-70% to secure hospital contracts. It dramatically reduced the revenue per unit in the public hospital channel but significantly increased volume by making implants affordable. VBP 2.0, expected in 2026, will run a similar process, and there is a widely cited risk that it will explicitly favor products with local Chinese manufacturing in eligibility or pricing. This directly motivates Straumann's Shanghai campus investment.

Cyclicality: Dental implants are more resilient than purely elective cosmetic procedures but less essential than acute medical care. The "if" of needing an implant is driven by medical reality; the "when" is influenced by financial confidence. In the 2023-2024 North American market, Straumann's management repeatedly cited "cautious consumer spending on out-of-pocket dental procedures" as the explanation for below-trend US growth. This is consistent with the broader observation that implant markets feel moderate recessions through demand deferral (not cancellation) and recover when consumer confidence returns.

Straumann's geographic diversification - with EMEA providing ~42% of revenue and LatAm growing rapidly - meaningfully reduces dependence on any single market cycle.

Section 7: Growth Triggers

From the four concalls: H1 2025 (13 Aug 2025), Q3 2025 (29 Oct 2025), FY2025 (18 Feb 2026), Q1 2026 (29 Apr 2026)

• China VBP 2.0 resolution and volume recovery in H2 2026. Management guided on the Q1 2026 call: "We anticipate growth in the second half regardless of VBP implementation timing." The FY2025 call characterized 2026 as "the reverse of 2025 - weaker first half in China and APAC, much stronger second half." As of Q1 2026, VBP 2.0 timing is assumed Q2 2026, with pent-up patient demand and distributor restocking expected to drive a meaningful volume inflection. (Q1 2026 call, Apr 29 2026; FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026; Q3 2025 call, Oct 29 2025 - mentioned across all three)

  "We have really organized ourselves to be able to have all the different options... No strong local challenger has emerged in China despite expectations." - CEO Guillaume Daniellot, FY2025 call (Reuters, Feb 2026)

• Shanghai campus uniqueness in VBP 2.0 positioning. Straumann is the only international premium brand with local Chinese manufacturing capability, with all NMPA licenses secured for both the Straumann and Anthogyr brands. This creates a regulatory and commercial moat for the VBP 2.0 process that management views as a decisive advantage over other international competitors. (FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026; Q3 2025 call, Oct 29 2025)

  "Straumann is the only international premium brand with local manufacturing, with all licenses and equivalents obtained." - Guillaume Daniellot, FY2025 call

• iEXCEL/BLC market share acceleration. By Q1 2026, iEXCEL represented over 20% of premium implant volume (up from 15% in H1 2025). The BLC design continues to attract dentists from competing brands. Management pointed to BLC specifically drawing 25% of its initial customers from non-Straumann users as evidence of the product's cross-competitive pull. (Q1 2026 call, Apr 29 2026; FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026; H1 2025 call, Aug 13 2025 - repeated across all three)

• ClearCorrect RemoteCare global rollout in 2026. The "ClearCorrect RemoteCare powered by DentalMonitoring" product, piloted at end of 2025, is set for full global launch in 2026. AI-powered remote monitoring integrated into the ClearCorrect platform is designed to improve patient compliance and enable GPs to manage larger aligner caseloads without proportionally more chair time. Management cites this as the key differentiator in repositioning ClearCorrect for the GP/DSO segment. (FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026; Q3 2025 call, Oct 29 2025)

• Smartee manufacturing partnership driving orthodontics cost structure improvement. The transfer of EMEA and APAC ClearCorrect aligner manufacturing to Smartee's facilities was confirmed completed by Q1 2026. Management described the Markkleeberg plant transition as on track, with meaningful improvement in the aligner cost structure expected to flow through in 2026 and beyond. (Q1 2026 call, Apr 29 2026; FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026)

• SIRIOS X3 opening mid-price scanner segment. The SIRIOS X3 intraoral scanner, launched in mid-2025 at a significantly lower price point than the SIRIOS flagship, targets the large segment of general dental practices that cannot justify the premium scanner price. Management cited "strong customer demand" at the Q3 2025 call and positioned it as a key entry point into the AXS ecosystem for practices not yet on the platform. (Q3 2025 call, Oct 29 2025; FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026)

• North America sequential improvement sustained. Management at H1 2025 guided for "gradual recovery in the US with continued above-market growth driven by innovation." By Q3 2025, NAM grew 5.7% organically. By Q4 2025, 6.8% organically. By Q1 2026, 7.7% organically. The improving trend is now three consecutive periods of acceleration. Management's Q1 2026 commentary cited "strong commercial execution and strategic customer partnerships" as the drivers. (Q1 2026 call, Apr 29 2026)

• Villeret manufacturing investment expanding premium implant capacity. The CHF 60-80 million, five-year investment at Villeret was announced at H1 2025 and confirmed ongoing. Increased capacity enables Straumann to service a growing global premium implant volume without constraint, removing a potential production ceiling that would otherwise cap growth in the premium tier. (H1 2025 call, Aug 13 2025; FY2025 call, Feb 18 2026)

• Capital Markets Day 2025 targets: ~10% organic growth CAGR through 2030. Management committed at CMD (Nov 25 2025) to approximately 10% organic CAGR with 40-50 basis points of annual core EBIT margin expansion through 2026-2030. The CMD guidance is the clearest multi-year growth signal management has communicated.

Section 8: Key Risks

1. China VBP 2.0: Worse than expected The mechanism: China's central government runs a national tender for hospital procurement of dental implants. Participating manufacturers submit price bids; those that win the tender supply China's public hospital system at the contracted price for the next several years. VBP 1.0 cut prices by 50-70% for the major tender winners. VBP 2.0, expected in Q2 2026, will repeat this process. The risk has two dimensions: pricing (cuts could be deeper than the 50-70% observed in round 1, particularly if the government uses local manufacturing as a qualification criterion that disqualifies high-cost international imports), and volume timing (if VBP is delayed further or runs a long tender process, the Chinese market remains depressed longer than the H2 2026 inflection that management is forecasting).

A more adverse scenario: VBP 2.0 explicitly includes local Chinese manufacturers as preferred or exclusive suppliers, and Straumann - despite its Shanghai campus - is unable to qualify because its product lines are classified as "imported" for regulatory purposes. Management has explicitly said this risk exists ("early indications that locally manufactured products would be favoured") and that their local manufacturing is specifically designed to address it. But there is no certainty until the tender rules are published.

Calibration: High-probability event (VBP 2.0 will happen), moderate-probability downside surprise (pricing more severe or timing extended), low-probability catastrophic scenario (Straumann excluded entirely from the Chinese market).

2. FX headwinds - structural CHF strength The mechanism: Straumann reports in Swiss Francs (CHF), which is one of the world's strongest and most defensively held currencies. Most revenue is earned in USD, EUR, BRL, and CNY. When the USD or EUR weakens against CHF, reported revenue and profits decline even if the underlying business is performing well. In 2025, FX cost approximately 470-490 basis points on revenue and 130-140 basis points on core EBIT margin. Management cannot hedge away structural currency risk - they can only absorb it or (partially) offset it with local cost bases.

Calibration: Permanent drag, variable in magnitude year to year, not a business-threatening risk but a meaningful headwind to reported growth that makes the company's underlying performance less visible to investors relying on reported figures.

3. ClearCorrect execution risk The mechanism: The 2025 orthodontics restructuring - closing manufacturing, shifting to Smartee, repositioning commercially - is operationally complex. Any delay in the Smartee production ramp could cause supply shortages for ClearCorrect customers. The DentalMonitoring integration adds software complexity. The GP/DSO commercial refocus requires a change in sales motion that takes 12-24 months to show results. If execution stumbles, Straumann could lose GP customers to Align Technology, whose Invisalign sales team is well-resourced and aggressive.

Calibration: Medium-probability, moderate-cost risk. ClearCorrect is currently a small percentage of group revenue; even a significant setback there would be damaging to the growth story but not threatening to the group's overall economics.

4. Tariffs on Neodent's US exports from Brazil The mechanism: Neodent manufactures in Curitiba, Brazil, and exports to North America. US tariffs on Brazilian goods - which escalated in 2025 - could add $20-30 million in annual cost if sustained (per management's H1 2025 concall estimate). Neodent is the primary vehicle for Straumann's challenger-tier growth in the US, particularly in the DSO channel. A permanent tariff increase either compresses Neodent margins in the US (if prices cannot be raised to offset) or reduces the brand's price competitiveness (if prices are raised).

Management's response has been inventory buildup and studying in-country manufacturing options for Neodent (the US already has manufacturing in Andover and Round Rock for the premium brand). However, a full Neodent US manufacturing transfer would require capital investment and time.

Calibration: Medium-probability (tariff policy is active and volatile), moderate-cost if sustained.

5. North America consumer confidence The mechanism: Dental implants are largely out-of-pocket in the US. The $4,000-6,000 total cost per implant (implant + abutment + crown) makes them sensitive to disposable income and consumer confidence. Straumann's North America organic growth was essentially flat in 2023, recovered slowly in 2024, and has been improving throughout 2025 and into 2026. A US economic slowdown, rising unemployment, or sustained high interest rates could reverse this recovery and keep North America below-trend for another 1-2 years.

Calibration: Medium-probability, moderate-cost drag. North America is ~26% of revenue; below-trend growth there is a meaningful headwind but does not threaten the group's overall double-digit organic growth ambition if EMEA and LatAm remain strong.

6. Asian competitor advance in value segment The mechanism: Osstem Implant, Dentium, and emerging Chinese manufacturers are all investing in international expansion. They are price-aggressive and improving in clinical documentation. In markets where Neodent competes on price, Osstem is a credible alternative at even lower price points. If Osstem successfully builds a clinical evidence base comparable to Neodent's and expands its distribution in EMEA, it competes directly for the mid-tier customer.

Calibration: Slow-moving structural risk, medium probability over a 5-year horizon. Neodent's advantage is in Latin America where it has deep brand equity and local manufacturing; in EMEA it is a newer entrant where this risk is more live.

7. Digital workflow disruption The mechanism: The dental digitization market is moving fast. 3Shape (private, Danish) is the scanner market leader by installed base. Align Technology's iTero ecosystem is deeply embedded with orthodontists. Medit (Korean, private) has been gaining scanner share aggressively on price. If the AXS platform fails to achieve critical mass - if enough practices choose competitor scanners and design software - Straumann's digital growth thesis stalls, and the prosthetics segment underperforms the CHF 6 billion addressable market opportunity management has described.

Calibration: Medium-probability, medium-cost risk. Straumann is entering digital with strong relationships and integration advantages (its own implant systems connect naturally to AXS), but it is a fast-moving market where incumbents with existing installed base (3Shape, iTero) have meaningful advantages.

Section 9: Walk the Talk

Concalls used: H1 2025 (13 Aug 2025), Q3 2025 (29 Oct 2025), FY2025 (18 Feb 2026), Q1 2026 (29 Apr 2026).

H1 2025 (August 13, 2025): What management said

At the H1 2025 call, CEO Guillaume Daniellot and new CFO Isabelle Adelt presented 10.2% organic growth for the half year - ahead of the "high single-digit" full-year guidance. Management confirmed the guidance unchanged. On China, they acknowledged the emerging VBP 2.0 concern: patients were delaying treatments and distributors were adjusting inventory, with VBP implementation described as expected in "Q4 2025." On North America, management used the phrase "gradual recovery with continued above-market growth driven by innovation." On margins, currency headwinds of 470-490 basis points on revenue and 130-140 basis points on margin were quantified for the first time - a refreshingly specific disclosure.

The MIDAS 3D printer launch in June 2025, the Shanghai campus progress, the iEXCEL traction (15% of premium volume), and the Villeret investment were all highlighted as structural progress. The tariff headwind from Brazilian manufacturing was estimated at $20-30 million if sustained, and management described inventory buildup as the near-term mitigation.

Q3 2025 (October 29, 2025): Delivering on the trend, with one miss

The Q3 result (8.3% organic growth) was within the guidance envelope and showed EMEA accelerating further while LatAm maintained double-digit momentum. North America improved to 5.7% - sequential progress matching the H1 guidance narrative.

The miss was China. VBP 2.0 had not arrived "in Q4" as expected - instead, the company reported meaningful softening in China as patients deferred treatment and distributors reduced inventories "ahead of the expected VBP 2.0." The Q3 call shifted the VBP expectation to "early next year [2026]." Management maintained the full-year 2025 guidance, which required a stronger Q4 to offset China weakness. This was the first visible guidance slip - not on the core business, but on the timing of an external regulatory event.

The Shanghai campus inauguration in September 2025 was confirmed - on time. The SIRIOS X3 launch was flagged as generating "strong customer demand." The Smartee/Markkleeberg transition was described as on track.

FY2025 (February 18, 2026): Delivering, beating, and repositioning

The full year result - 8.9% organic growth, core EBIT margin of 26.5% at constant currency - came in at the upper end of guidance on organic growth and beat on margins. The Q4 result (7.0% organic) showed China was indeed a Q4 drag (APAC declined 12.8% organically in Q4 due to VBP destocking), but EMEA delivered 15.3% organic in Q4 and LatAm 20.0%, more than compensating.

Management delivered on the core business. On China: the timing had shifted again, from "early 2026" to "we assume Q2 2026." On North America: the sequential improvement narrative held, with Q4 at 6.8% organic, the strongest quarter of the year.

The key new information was 2026 guidance: "high single-digit organic growth" + "30-60 bps margin improvement at constant 2025 FX" - with the explicit caveat that H1 would be weaker and H2 stronger (driven by the China inflection assumption). The CMD 2025 targets (~10% organic CAGR through 2030, 40-50 bps margin expansion per year) were also presented as the new medium-term framework, replacing the earlier "at least 10%" phrasing with a more realistic "approximately 10%" after analyst pressure.

iEXCEL exceeded one million units - confirming the H1 2025 momentum assessment. ClearCorrect's transformation (Smartee, DentalMonitoring) was confirmed as progressing.

Q1 2026 (April 29, 2026): The first 2026 print

Q1 2026: 7.1% organic growth - at the lower end of "high single-digit" but not a miss relative to guidance. North America at 7.7% organic was the strongest in three years, validating the sequential improvement narrative management had guided to since H1 2025. LatAm at 19.5% organic was spectacular. EMEA at 7.8% was solid.

APAC at 0.5% reflected exactly what management had guided - a weak first half in China as VBP 2.0 timing remained uncertain. Management reiterated H2 2026 recovery in China, noting that "growth in the second half" was expected "regardless of VBP implementation timing." The FX headwind narrowed slightly (100-120 bps on margin for full year 2026 vs. 130-140 bps in 2025). iEXCEL >20% of premium volume was confirmed.

No new guidance was provided - management reiterated the same framework: high single-digit organic growth, 30-60 bps margin expansion.

Assessment:

On the core business (EMEA, North America, LatAm trajectory, iEXCEL adoption, margin framework), this management has delivered consistently against what it promised. The margin guidance of "30-60 bps improvement" was met in 2025. The iEXCEL adoption curve has tracked or exceeded statements at every concall. North America's sequential improvement has played out exactly as guided over four periods.

The one area of repeated guidance slippage is China VBP timing. Each call has pushed the VBP 2.0 implementation date forward by one or two quarters: "Q4 2025" → "early 2026" → "Q2 2026" (assumed). This is not evidence of management misleading investors - the regulatory timeline is genuinely outside Straumann's control and China's government has not published a fixed schedule. But investors should apply a discount to any specific China timing guidance. The underlying business logic (local manufacturing, only international premium brand in tender) is sound; the timing is uncertain.

Overall verdict: a management team that is consistent, specific, and accurate on the core business, and appropriately uncertain on regulatory events it cannot control. They are conservative guiders - "high single-digit" is a wide enough range that it accommodates most outcomes - but they have not committed to anything they have failed to deliver on the core business.

Section 10: Shareholder Friendliness Index

Straumann returns capital primarily through dividends, not buybacks. The dividend has grown every year for the last five consecutive years. For the last three financial years:

• FY2023 dividend (paid April 2024): CHF 0.85 per share
• FY2024 dividend (paid April 2025): CHF 0.95 per share (+11.8%)
• FY2025 dividend (paid April 2026): CHF 1.00 per share (+5.3%)

The payout ratio for FY2025 is approximately 33% of core EPS (CHF 1.00 dividend / CHF 2.99 core EPS), which is conservative for a mature cash-generating business and leaves substantial room for dividend growth alongside ongoing capex reinvestment. The FY2025 capex was unusually high (CHF 223.5 million, up 33% year-over-year) reflecting the Shanghai campus, Villeret expansion, and Medentika facility growth - all one-time-ish investments. As these spend cycles complete, free cash flow conversion should improve and could support accelerating dividend growth.

On buybacks: Straumann does not operate a meaningful share repurchase program. Shares outstanding are approximately 159.45 million, with growth of roughly 0.09% per year from management stock option exercises - effectively flat. The company has historically chosen to allocate capital to M&A (Neodent 2012, ClearCorrect 2018, Anthogyr 2019) and organic growth capex rather than buybacks. At the CMD 2025, management committed to improving free cash flow conversion through 2030, which could eventually support a formal buyback program, but there is no announced program as of Q1 2026.

Verdict: Returns Capital - consistently growing dividend every year, conservative payout ratio with significant capacity for future growth, minimal dilution.

Section 11: Insider Activities

Primary source: SIX Exchange Regulation Art. 56 management transaction filings, accessed via Hargreaves Lansdown director dealings data. The SIX Exchange Regulation database is the primary disclosure venue for Swiss-listed companies. Note: HL aggregates the SIX filings but does not identify insiders by name in its public summary view; names are available in the primary SIX filings directly.

Recent transactions (last 12 months, most recent first):

Note: SIX filings assign transaction type but the HL public view does not identify individuals. Context from board announcements is used to interpret the March 25 sale.

Buys - read the signal:

The May 7, 2026 cluster purchase is the most significant signal in this table. Five separate executive directors and/or management committee members made open-market purchases on the same day at CHF 64.56 per share. The stock was trading approximately 20-25% below the March 2026 price of CHF 80-82. Cluster buying at a meaningfully lower price, by five different insiders on the same day, is a textbook insider conviction signal. These are people who know the business quarter-by-quarter and have chosen to put their own money to work at what they evidently perceive as a discount. This is a very bullish signal.

The three small purchases by board members in March (1,800 shares at CHF 81.98, 1,400 at CHF 76.38, 3,800 at CHF 77.70) are consistent but less striking - routine accumulation-style buying at board level.

Sells - work out the why:

The March 25 sale of 634,400 shares at CHF 80.56 (approximately CHF 51.1 million) by a Non-Executive Director requires context. At the March 2026 AGM, Thomas Straumann - founder's grandson, 36+ years with the company, 12 years as Chairman - transitioned to the role of Honorary Chairman. His son-in-law Sébastien Schatzmann joined the Board as a new member. This governance transition, combined with the scale of the March 25 sale (which is implausible as routine personal portfolio management for anyone except a major shareholder), strongly suggests this is Thomas Straumann restructuring his personal stake as part of the board/estate succession process - a transfer of assets, diversification, or foundation gift rather than a negative business signal. No explicit reason was disclosed in the filing per HL's summary.

The March 16 sale of 31,250 shares (approximately CHF 2.5 million) by a Non-Executive Director is smaller and could reflect any number of routine personal financial reasons. Reason not explicitly disclosed.

Net assessment:

The most important data point here is the May 2026 cluster buy. Five insiders buying simultaneously at a 20%+ discount to recent prices is not coincidence - it reflects internal conviction that the current price represents a disconnect from the business fundamentals. The large March sale appears to be estate/succession-related and should not be read as a bearish signal. On balance, the insider activity pattern skews bullish.

Section 12: Scenarios

Bull case

VBP 2.0 is implemented in Q2 2026 with terms that treat Straumann's Shanghai manufacturing as locally compliant. The pricing cut is within the 50-70% range seen in VBP 1.0 (painful but navigable), and the volume surge in H2 2026 - patients who deferred treatment for 6-9 months flooding back, distributors restocking - delivers a strong H2 inflection. China returns to double-digit volume growth in 2027. Asia-Pacific, which spent 2025 and H1 2026 as a drag, becomes the group's fastest-growing region.

Simultaneously, iEXCEL consolidates its position at 25-30% of premium global implant volume by 2027, and the BLC's cross-competitive appeal attracts clinicians trained on Nobel Biocare and Dentsply systems. North America's sequential improvement accelerates as consumer spending normalizes - implant procedure volumes recover to structural trend growth rates of 7-9% organically. Neodent continues its geographic expansion in EMEA and Asia, penetrating markets where Straumann premium has no established presence.

ClearCorrect RemoteCare, powered by DentalMonitoring's AI monitoring, lands with GPs and DSOs and transforms ClearCorrect from a margin drag into a profitable, scalable business. The Smartee manufacturing partnership delivers the cost structure that makes ClearCorrect competitive with budget aligner brands. By 2028, orthodontics is breakeven to profitable at the segment level.

The Villeret and Shanghai manufacturing ramps complete on schedule, driving operating leverage as production costs per unit decline with scale. The AXS platform achieves enough critical mass that it becomes a genuine ecosystem - practices that are on AXS buy more Straumann products per year than those that aren't.

The result by 2027-2028 is an organization delivering close to the CMD's ~10% organic CAGR targets, with margin expansion at the upper end of the 40-50 bps/year range.

Base case

China VBP 2.0 happens sometime in H1-H2 2026. Pricing cuts are significant but Straumann's local manufacturing qualifies it for the program. Volume recovers through H2 2026 and 2027, but the pricing reset means that China's contribution to group growth is volume-led at materially lower per-unit revenue than pre-VBP. North America continues its gradual improvement, reaching 7-9% organic growth by 2027. EMEA and LatAm remain reliable mid-to-high single digit and double digit growers, respectively.

iEXCEL tracks management's adoption curve and Neodent continues executing geographically. ClearCorrect stabilizes - stops being a drag but doesn't yet contribute meaningfully to growth. Digital (SIRIOS, AXS, MIDAS) grows at above-group-average rates but from a still-small base.

The CMD 2025 framework plays out roughly on schedule: approximately 10% organic CAGR over the 2026-2030 period, with margin expansion of 40-50 bps per year delivered mainly through operating leverage as revenue grows faster than the fixed-cost base. Free cash flow conversion improves as the current capex cycle (Shanghai, Villeret) completes.

The group continues returning capital through a steadily growing dividend while maintaining the balance sheet strength to pursue bolt-on acquisitions in digital dentistry or prosthetics.

Bear case

VBP 2.0 is delayed into Q3-Q4 2026, keeping Asia-Pacific depressed for the entire year. When VBP 2.0 finally arrives, its terms favor local Chinese brands - Straumann's Shanghai campus qualifies but only at pricing 60-70% below historical levels, making China structurally less profitable than management's model assumes. A local Chinese manufacturer achieves enough clinical credibility to win meaningful hospital contracts that previously would have gone to Straumann or Anthogyr.

In North America, consumer confidence deteriorates as a mild recession reduces elective out-of-pocket spending. The sequential improvement stalls and NAM organic growth retreats to 2-4%. This is happening while US tariffs on Brazilian goods remain elevated, permanently pressuring Neodent margins in the US and making Neodent less competitive against Asian value alternatives.

ClearCorrect's Smartee manufacturing transition hits operational delays - supply shortages cause churn among GP customers who switch to Align Technology's expanding GP-focused offering. The DentalMonitoring AI integration launches late and fails to differentiate meaningfully against Invisalign's monitoring tools, which have a larger installed base and more training data.

The operating leverage story stalls because the fixed cost investments (Shanghai, Villeret, digital platform) run ahead of revenue. CHF remains strong against USD and EUR, clipping reported margins further. The result is an organization delivering 5-7% organic growth rather than the CMD's ~10% target, with margin expansion at the low end of the range or missing it in the years where China and North America disappoint simultaneously.

Sources consulted:

• Straumann Group Q1 2026 Results Highlights
• Straumann Q1 2026 Earnings Call Transcript - GuruFocus
• Straumann Holding AG Q1 2026 Seeking Alpha Transcript
• Full Year 2025 Straumann Earnings Call Transcript - GuruFocus
• Straumann FY2025 Press Release - EQS News
• Straumann H1 2025 Results - EQS News
• Straumann Q2 2025 Earnings Call Transcript - Investing.com
• Straumann Q3 2025 Results - TradingView/EQS
• Straumann Q3 2025 Earnings Highlights - GuruFocus
• Straumann Capital Markets Day 2025 - EQS News
• Straumann CMD 2025 - Investing.com
• Straumann Orthodontics Transformation Announcement - EQS News
• Straumann Wikipedia
• Dental Implants Market Size 2025-2030 - MarketsandMarkets
• Straumann Dividend History - DivvyDiary
• Straumann Director Share Dealings - Hargreaves Lansdown
• Straumann iEXCEL Product Page
• Straumann 2026 Growth Outlook - Global Banking & Finance
• Straumann Annual Reports - IR page