Haw Par Corporation Limited (H02.SI) - Deep Dive Research Report

Research Date: 12 May 2026

Important Note on Earnings Calls: Haw Par Corporation is a family-controlled Singapore conglomerate that does not conduct quarterly earnings conference calls. The company reports financial results semi-annually (half-year in August, full-year in February) via SGX filings and responds to shareholder questions at its Annual General Meeting. This report draws on AGM responses, annual report management discussions, and SGX filings in lieu of traditional concall transcripts. Sections that require concall citations (7 and 9) have been adapted accordingly and are sourced from these official disclosures.

1. What the Company Does

Haw Par Corporation makes Tiger Balm - the red-and-yellow hexagonal jar that has been sitting in medicine cabinets across Asia for over a century. That is the simple version. The full picture is more complicated: Haw Par is a Singapore-listed conglomerate that operates a consumer healthcare business, owns a portfolio of commercial properties, runs an oceanarium in Thailand, and holds billions of dollars worth of shares in two other publicly listed companies. It is essentially three businesses wearing one corporate wrapper.

The company traces its origins to the 1870s in Rangoon (now Yangon), Myanmar, where a Fujian-province herbalist named Aw Chu Kin set up an apothecary shop called Eng Aun Tong - the Hall of Everlasting Peace. When Chu Kin died in 1908, his sons inherited the practice. The younger son, Aw Boon Par (the "gentle leopard"), found the burden too heavy and called his elder brother Aw Boon Haw (the "gentle tiger") back from China to help run the family business.

The brothers reformulated their father's herbal ointment into a product they called Ban Kim Ewe - "Ten Thousand Golden Oils" - a camphor-and-menthol balm marketed as a cure-all for headaches, muscle aches, insect bites, and congestion. In 1909, Boon Haw gave it a trademark: his own name. Tiger Balm was born.

Boon Haw was a showman. He moved the operation to Singapore in 1926, built a factory ten times larger than the one in Rangoon, and toured small towns across Malaya in a custom-built car shaped like a tiger that roared instead of honked. He handed out free samples at every stop. The strategy worked. By the time Boon Haw died in 1954, Tiger Balm was a household name across Southeast Asia.

The modern corporate entity - Haw Par Brothers International Limited - was incorporated in July 1969 to list the Aw family's assets on the stock exchange. Within a year, the Aw family sold their controlling interest to the British investment firm Slater Walker, which transformed the family business into a diversified conglomerate. After Slater Walker collapsed in the 1970s banking crisis, Singaporean banker Wee Cho Yaw assumed the chairmanship in December 1978 and gradually acquired control. The Wee family - founders and controllers of United Overseas Bank (UOB) - has controlled Haw Par ever since.

Today, Haw Par's core value proposition is deceptively simple: it owns one of the most recognized consumer healthcare brands in Asia, manufactures it cheaply with a formula that has barely changed in a century, and distributes it to over 100 countries. The product works. It is cheap. It requires no prescription. And the brand is so deeply embedded in Asian culture that it practically sells itself. On top of this operating business, Haw Par sits on a pile of financial assets - primarily shares in UOB and UOL Group - that generate dividend income exceeding the operating profits of Tiger Balm itself.

The result is an unusual corporate hybrid: part consumer staples company, part investment holding vehicle, with a property and leisure appendage. Understanding Haw Par requires understanding all three layers, because the operating business, the investment portfolio, and the property assets each follow different economic logic.

2. Business Segments

Haw Par reports three segments: Healthcare, Investments, and Others (which bundles Property and Leisure). The segment structure reflects the historical layering of family business assets rather than any operational synergy between the divisions.

2.1 Healthcare

This is Tiger Balm. The Healthcare segment manufactures and distributes topical analgesic products under the Tiger Balm and Kwan Loong brands. It is the operating heartbeat of the company and the reason Haw Par exists as a consumer-facing business rather than a pure investment holding vehicle.

The segment is run through Haw Par Healthcare Limited, a wholly-owned Singapore subsidiary that oversees all manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. Manufacturing happens across multiple countries: Singapore (the historical home base), Malaysia (Tiger Balm (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. in Johor Bahru, with a new expanded plant commissioning from 2025), China (Xiamen Tiger Medicals Co., Ltd.), Thailand, and Japan. Products sold in India are manufactured locally by Makson and marketed by Alkem Laboratories under a licensing arrangement.

Tiger Balm products are sold in over 100 countries. The core markets are ASEAN nations (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia), greater China (Hong Kong, Taiwan), and a growing presence in Europe and North America. Distribution relies on a mix of direct sales, third-party distributors (DKSH handles several ASEAN markets including Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand), and local partners (Prince of Peace Enterprises is the sole US distributor; Alkem handles India).

Healthcare revenue was approximately S$226 million in FY2024, representing the vast majority of group operating revenue. The segment has compounded at roughly 6-8% annually over the past decade, interrupted only by a severe pandemic-related drop in 2020-2021 when revenue contracted approximately 60% in ASEAN markets (Tiger Balm's sales correlate with physical activity and in-person retail, both of which collapsed during lockdowns). Recovery has been strong - FY2024 revenue exceeded pre-pandemic levels.

The segment's core capability is brand equity and low-cost manufacturing of a product with a century of consumer trust. The formula is simple - camphor, menthol, cajuput oil, clove oil in a paraffin base - but the brand carries deep cultural associations across Asia that would take decades to replicate. Operating margins in the healthcare segment are healthy (operating profit of S$62.6 million on S$226 million revenue in FY2024, roughly 28%), though they have come under modest pressure from rising input costs.

Healthcare is approximately 80% or more of group operating profits and is the segment that defines Haw Par's identity to customers and investors alike.

2.2 Investments

This is the segment that dominates Haw Par's reported profits, even though it involves no employees, no factories, and no customers. The Investments segment holds long-term equity stakes in publicly listed companies, predominantly:

• United Overseas Bank (UOB): approximately 74.85 million shares. UOB is the third-largest bank in Southeast Asia by assets, with operations across Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Greater China. At recent market prices, this stake is worth approximately S$2.1-2.8 billion.

• UOL Group: approximately 72.04 million shares. UOL is a Singapore-based property developer and hotel operator (Pan Pacific, Parkroyal brands). This stake is worth approximately S$450-500 million.

Combined, these two holdings are worth roughly S$2.6-3.3 billion - significantly more than Haw Par's own market capitalization. This is the crux of the "Haw Par as a value trap" narrative that has persisted for decades.

In FY2025, investment income (primarily dividends from UOB and UOL plus fair value changes) was S$208.8 million - roughly three times the operating profit of the Healthcare segment. This income flows straight to the bottom line with no associated operating costs, which is why Haw Par's net profit (S$265.5 million in FY2025) vastly exceeds its operating profit from actual business operations (S$67.1 million).

The Investments segment exists because the Wee family uses Haw Par as one node in a complex web of cross-holdings that cement family control over UOB and its related entities. Haw Par holds UOB shares. UOB holds stakes in other Wee-family entities. The circular ownership structure means that no single hostile actor can easily unwind the family's control of the banking group. For Haw Par's minority shareholders, this creates a frustrating dynamic: the company is worth more as a collection of parts than as a going concern, but the controlling family has no incentive to unlock that value.

2.3 Others (Property and Leisure)

This segment bundles two unrelated businesses that are individually too small to report separately.

Property: Haw Par owns four investment properties with a total lettable area of 45,205 square metres:

• Haw Par Centre - a six-storey office building in Singapore, 10,096 sqm, 99-year lease from 1952
• Haw Par Glass Tower - a nine-storey office building in Singapore, 3,316 sqm, 99-year lease from 1970
• Haw Par Technocentre - a seven-storey industrial building in Singapore, 15,707 sqm, 99-year lease from 1963
• Menara Haw Par - a 32-storey commercial freehold tower in Kuala Lumpur, 16,131 sqm

These properties are carried at historical cost of approximately S$50 million but are estimated to be worth over S$200 million at market value. The Singapore properties benefit from tight supply in a mature market. The KL office tower has struggled with occupancy due to chronic oversupply in the Kuala Lumpur office market.

Leisure: Haw Par operates Underwater World Pattaya (UWP), an oceanarium in Thailand featuring a 105-metre glass tunnel with over 2,500 marine animals. This is a small tourism business that contributes minimal revenue (estimated S$4-5 million annually). Haw Par previously operated Underwater World Singapore on Sentosa Island, which closed in 2016.

The Others segment contributes less than 5% of group revenue and is essentially a legacy collection of family assets. It is neither a growth driver nor a strategic priority.

3. Products and Business Detail

Tiger Balm Product Range

Tiger Balm has evolved from a single jar of ointment into a full line of topical analgesic products across multiple formats:

Ointments (the original format):

• Tiger Balm Red Ointment - the classic, strongest-scented version, positioned for muscle and joint pain
• Tiger Balm White Ointment - milder formulation for headaches and nasal congestion
• Tiger Balm Ultra Strength Ointment - the most concentrated formulation, non-staining
• Tiger Balm Extra Strength Ointment - positioned for arthritis and joint pain

Creams and Rubs:

• Tiger Balm Muscle Rub - pre-workout preparation and post-exercise recovery
• Tiger Balm Active Muscle Rub - warming cream for athletes, non-greasy
• Tiger Balm Arthritis Rub - pump dispenser format for arthritic hands
• Tiger Balm Neck & Shoulder Rub - targeted formulation for upper body tension

Patches:

• Tiger Balm Pain Relieving Patch (Small) - for neck, shoulder, and localized pain
• Tiger Balm Pain Relieving Patch (Large) - for lower back and larger muscle groups

Liquids:

• Tiger Balm Active Muscle Spray - convenient spray format for athletes
• Tiger Balm Liniment Oil - oil-based formulation

Mosquito Repellent Range (select markets):

• Tiger Balm Mosquito Repellent Patch
• Tiger Balm Mosquito Repellent Spray

Kwan Loong

Kwan Loong is Haw Par's second brand, acquired in 1972 when Haw Par bought Kwan Loong & Co., an Ipoh, Malaysia-based medicated oil company. The product line is simpler:

• Kwan Loong Medicated Oil - concentrated blend of methyl salicylate, menthol, eucalyptus oil, and lavender oil for temporary relief of muscle and joint pain
• Kwan Loong Refresher - a lighter formulation

Kwan Loong is positioned as a complementary brand to Tiger Balm, particularly strong in Malaysia and among Chinese diaspora communities globally. It is manufactured under GMP standards by Haw Par Healthcare.

Active Ingredients and Manufacturing

Tiger Balm's core formulation relies on a handful of well-known counterirritant ingredients: camphor (up to 25%), menthol (up to 16%), cajuput oil, clove oil, and methyl salicylate in varying combinations depending on the specific product. These are classified as over-the-counter (OTC) topical analgesics in most markets.

The manufacturing process is not technically complex - these are relatively simple formulations of natural and synthetic ingredients in petroleum jelly or cream bases. What makes the business defensible is not process knowledge but rather:

1. Regulatory approvals: Tiger Balm is registered as an OTC medication (not just a cosmetic) in most markets, requiring Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification at every facility. Achieving and maintaining these certifications across factories in Singapore, Malaysia, China, Thailand, and Japan is a multi-year process.

2. Scale and cost: Haw Par's factories run continuously producing a narrow product range at high volumes, giving it cost advantages that smaller competitors cannot match.

3. Brand trust: In a category where consumers apply products directly to their skin, brand trust matters enormously. Tiger Balm has accumulated that trust over 117 years.

Manufacturing Footprint

• Singapore - original manufacturing base, houses R&D and product development
• Malaysia (Johor Bahru) - Tiger Balm (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., expanded with new plant commissioning from 2025 to meet future demand
• China (Xiamen) - Xiamen Tiger Medicals Co., Ltd., produces products for the Chinese domestic market and the US market
• Thailand - production facility supporting ASEAN distribution
• Japan - manufacturing for the Japanese market
• India - licensed manufacturing by Makson, distributed by Alkem Laboratories

Geographic Revenue Distribution

The revenue footprint follows Asian population density and the Chinese diaspora:

• ASEAN (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia) - the largest market, generating approximately S$88.7 million from Tiger Balm alone in FY2023, though still recovering to pre-pandemic levels
• Other Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India) - significant and growing
• Europe - a meaningful and growing market, particularly in France, Germany, and the UK
• North America - growing but smaller, approximately US$30 million annually in the US, all sourced from the Xiamen (China) factory and distributed by Prince of Peace Enterprises
• Rest of World - Middle East, Africa, Latin America through various distributors

Key Milestones

• 1909: Tiger Balm trademark created by Aw Boon Haw
• 1926: Operations moved to Singapore, first large-scale factory on Neil Road
• 1969: Haw Par Brothers International Limited incorporated and listed on SGX
• 1972: Acquisition of Kwan Loong & Co.
• 1978: Wee Cho Yaw becomes Chairman, beginning of Wee family control era
• 2003: Underwater World Pattaya opens
• 2016: Underwater World Singapore closes
• 2017: Licensing deal with Alkem Laboratories for India market entry
• 2025: New expanded manufacturing plant begins commissioning in Malaysia

4. Customers

Who Buys Tiger Balm

Tiger Balm's customer base spans a spectrum:

Retail consumers (direct end-users):

• Older adults managing chronic muscle and joint pain, arthritis, and general aches
• Athletes and physically active individuals using it for pre-workout warming, post-exercise recovery, and minor sports injuries
• Parents treating children's insect bites, colds, and minor bruises
• Migraine and headache sufferers using the white ointment formula
• Cultural users in Southeast Asia and China who use Tiger Balm as a general household remedy for virtually anything

The buying decision is almost always made by the individual consumer at the retail shelf or online. There is no B2B sales cycle, no RFP process, no procurement department to convince. Tiger Balm is an impulse-to-habitual purchase in the S$3-15 range depending on market and product format.

Retail channels (trade customers):

• Pharmacies and drugstores (the primary channel - approximately 57% of topical analgesic sales globally go through retail pharmacies)
• Supermarkets and hypermarkets
• Convenience stores (particularly in Asia)
• E-commerce platforms (Amazon, Lazada, Shopee)
• Big-box retailers in the US (Walmart, Target, CVS)

Distribution partners (B2B relationships):

• DKSH - handles distribution in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand
• Prince of Peace Enterprises - sole US distributor, based in Livermore, California
• Alkem Laboratories - exclusive marketing and distribution partner for India
• Various country-specific distributors across 100+ markets

Why They Buy

1. Cultural familiarity: In Southeast Asia and among Chinese diaspora communities, Tiger Balm is an inherited remedy - people grew up with it in the house and reach for it by reflex.
2. Efficacy: The menthol-camphor formulation genuinely provides temporary relief from muscle pain through counterirritant action. It works.
3. Price: Tiger Balm is affordable. A jar costs a few dollars and lasts weeks or months.
4. Versatility: The same product handles muscle aches, headaches, insect bites, congestion, and minor burns - making it a medicine cabinet staple.
5. Brand trust: Over 100 years old, OTC-registered, GMP-manufactured. Consumers trust what they put on their skin.

Switching Costs

Switching costs are low in theory - there is nothing stopping a consumer from buying Salonpas or Bengay instead. In practice, switching costs are moderate because:

• Habitual purchasing behavior is sticky in consumer healthcare
• The product is cheap enough that price competition doesn't drive switching
• Cultural attachment (particularly in Asia) creates emotional loyalty that rational alternatives cannot easily dislodge
• Regulatory registration as an OTC product in each market creates a barrier for new competitors, even if it doesn't lock in existing customers

Customer Concentration

There is no meaningful customer concentration risk at the end-consumer level - Tiger Balm's customers are millions of individual buyers across 100+ countries. At the distribution level, there is some concentration: Prince of Peace is the sole US distributor, DKSH handles several large ASEAN markets, and Alkem is the sole India partner. Loss of any one distribution partner would disrupt a specific market but would not threaten the overall business.

Contract Structure

Revenue is primarily sell-through to distributors and retailers. There are no long-term take-or-pay contracts, no minimum volume commitments from retailers, and no recurring subscription revenue. This is classic consumer products economics: Haw Par sells product to distributors and retailers, who sell to consumers. Revenue is recognized on shipment.

5. Competitive Landscape

The Global Topical Analgesic Market

The topical analgesic market was valued at approximately US$11.9 billion in 2025, growing at roughly 5-6% annually, driven by aging populations, increased sports participation, and growing consumer preference for non-opioid pain management.

Tiger Balm competes in this market as a heritage brand with deep Asian roots, facing off against both global pharmaceutical companies and regional competitors.

Named Competitors

Hisamitsu Pharmaceutical (Salonpas) - Japan-based, the single most direct global competitor. Salonpas holds the number-one global market share in OTC topical analgesic patches (per Euromonitor, three consecutive years from 2016). Salonpas is sold in over 50 countries with particular strength in Japan, Southeast Asia, and the US. Hisamitsu's advantage is in the patch format - an area where Tiger Balm has expanded but where Salonpas has deeper expertise and market share. Hisamitsu's revenue is multiples of Haw Par's healthcare segment.

GSK (Voltaren) - The prescription-to-OTC switch of diclofenac gel (Voltaren) created a powerful competitor in Western markets. Voltaren is an NSAID (non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug), chemically different from Tiger Balm's counterirritant approach. It is backed by GSK's massive marketing budget and pharmacy relationships. In the US and Europe, Voltaren is a more serious competitor than Salonpas.

Chattem/Sanofi (Icy Hot, Bengay) - Icy Hot is the top-selling external analgesic rub brand in the US (approximately US$156 million in US sales in 2019). Bengay is another legacy brand. Both compete in the same "muscle rub" space as Tiger Balm but are primarily Western-market brands with limited Asian presence.

Performance Health (Biofreeze) - A menthol-based topical pain relief gel popular among physical therapists and sports professionals in the US. Professional endorsement gives it credibility in the clinical/sports channel.

Chinese competitors (Lingrui, Huarun 999) - Chinese manufacturers are expanding globally with competitively priced products, particularly in emerging markets. These represent a growing threat in price-sensitive segments.

Indian competitors (Zandu Balm/Emami, Amrutanjan, Moov/Reckitt) - Tiger Balm's own licensed partner Alkem competes against deeply entrenched local brands in India. Zandu Balm and Amrutanjan have decades of brand equity in the Indian market and extensive rural distribution networks.

Why Tiger Balm Wins

• Brand heritage: No competitor can replicate 117 years of cultural embedding across Asia
• Asian dominance: In ASEAN markets, Tiger Balm is often synonymous with the category itself
• Product versatility: Positioned as a multi-use remedy rather than a single-purpose pain product
• Price positioning: Accessible to mass-market consumers across income levels
• Distribution depth: 100+ countries with established partnerships

Where Tiger Balm Loses

• Western markets: Against Voltaren, Icy Hot, and Salonpas, Tiger Balm is a niche ethnic/heritage brand, not a mainstream first choice
• Patch format: Salonpas dominates the patch segment, which is the fastest-growing product format (9% CAGR)
• Marketing spend: Haw Par's marketing budget is a fraction of what GSK, Sanofi, or Hisamitsu spend. Tiger Balm relies on brand loyalty rather than advertising push
• Medical credibility: Voltaren has clinical trial data and NSAID pharmacology. Tiger Balm relies on traditional remedy positioning, which limits its credibility with younger, evidence-oriented Western consumers

Barriers to Entry

Barriers are moderate:

• OTC regulatory registration in each country requires GMP certification and product testing, creating a 1-3 year barrier for new entrants in any given market
• Building brand trust in topical healthcare takes years of consistent presence
• Established distribution relationships (shelf space at pharmacies, relationships with DKSH) are hard to displace
• But the underlying technology is simple and replicable; no patent protection remains on the core formulation

6. Industry

Demand Drivers

Demand for topical analgesics is driven by five structural forces:

1. Aging populations: The global population over 60 will double from 1 billion (2020) to 2.1 billion by 2050. Older adults are the heaviest users of topical pain relief for arthritis, joint stiffness, and chronic musculoskeletal pain. Asia's aging trajectory is particularly steep - Japan, South Korea, China, Thailand, and Singapore all face rapidly aging demographics.

2. Sports and fitness participation: Rising health consciousness, especially post-pandemic, has increased sports participation across all age groups. This drives demand for pre-workout warming products, post-exercise recovery, and minor injury treatment.

3. Shift from oral to topical pain management: Growing awareness of opioid risks and gastrointestinal side effects of oral NSAIDs has pushed consumers and physicians toward topical alternatives. Non-opioid topical analgesics accounted for 86.4% of the topical analgesic market in 2025.

4. Rising disposable income in emerging markets: As incomes rise in Southeast Asia, India, and Africa, consumers upgrade from unbranded or home remedies to branded OTC products like Tiger Balm.

5. E-commerce expansion: Online pharmacies are the fastest-growing distribution channel (8.4% CAGR), making Tiger Balm accessible in markets where physical retail distribution is limited.

Market Size

The global topical analgesic market was estimated at US$11.9 billion in 2025, projected to reach US$15.8-18.6 billion by 2031-2032, depending on the research firm. Asia-Pacific is forecast to register the highest growth rate (6.1% CAGR) through 2031.

By format, creams and gels account for 45.7% of revenue (Tiger Balm's traditional stronghold), while patches are the fastest-growing segment at 9% CAGR.

Where Haw Par Sits in the Global Supply Chain

Haw Par is a vertically integrated manufacturer-to-consumer business. It sources raw materials (camphor, menthol, essential oils, petroleum jelly, packaging), manufactures finished products at its own factories, and distributes through owned subsidiaries and third-party partners. There is no intermediary between Haw Par's factories and the retail shelf except its distribution partners.

Regulatory Environment

Topical analgesics are regulated as OTC drugs (not cosmetics) in most developed markets, requiring:

• GMP certification for manufacturing facilities
• Product registration with national drug regulatory authorities (FDA in the US, HSA in Singapore, TGA in Australia, etc.)
• Compliance with labeling and advertising restrictions
• Periodic facility inspections

This regulatory framework is a net positive for incumbent players like Haw Par - it raises the cost of entry and ensures product safety standards that reinforce consumer trust.

Cyclicality

The topical analgesic market is largely non-cyclical. Pain does not follow economic cycles. However, two specific sources of cyclicality affect Haw Par:

• Tourism correlation: In Asian markets, Tiger Balm sales benefit from tourist traffic (travellers buy it as a souvenir or try-before-you-buy product). Tourism collapsed during COVID-19 and took years to fully recover.
• Currency exposure: As a Singapore-dollar reporter selling in 100+ currencies, Haw Par's revenue is sensitive to FX movements, particularly the SGD/MYR, SGD/THB, and SGD/USD rates.

Tariff Risk (2025)

The 2025 US trade war introduced a significant new headwind. Tiger Balm products sold in the US are manufactured at the Xiamen factory in China. With US tariffs on Chinese goods reaching 145%, Prince of Peace Enterprises (the sole US distributor) estimated tariff costs of US$3-5 million annually on approximately US$30 million of US sales. Retail prices had not yet been raised as of mid-2025, meaning the distributor was absorbing the cost. Big-box retailers require 90 days' notice for price changes, creating a painful lag between tariff imposition and price adjustment.

7. Growth Triggers

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report (published April 2026), FY2024 Annual Report (published April 2025), H1 2025 Results (August 2025), AGM 2026 Shareholder Q&A (April 2026), AGM 2025 Shareholder Q&A (April 2025).

• Malaysia manufacturing expansion: New plant in Johor Bahru expected to begin commercial supply from 2025 onward. This expands production capacity to meet growing Asian demand and reduces reliance on the Singapore and China factories. (FY2024 Annual Report; repeated in FY2025 Annual Report)

• New product variations targeting younger consumers: Management has disclosed plans to launch new product formats and formulations designed to appeal to a younger generation of users who may not have the cultural attachment to the traditional ointment jar. (FY2024 Annual Report)

• Recovery of ASEAN tourism markets: ASEAN revenues were still below 2019 highs as of FY2023 but have been recovering. Full recovery of tourism across Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore would provide a tailwind to regional sales. (FY2023 Annual Report; confirmed by H1 2025 results showing 7% revenue growth)

• European market expansion: Management has cited strong demand growth in European markets as a driver of recent revenue increases. Europe represents a relatively underpenetrated market with high growth potential for Tiger Balm. (FY2024 Annual Report; FY2025 results confirmation)

• India market development via Alkem partnership: The 2017 licensing deal with Alkem Laboratories gives Tiger Balm access to India's 1.4 billion consumers through Alkem's extensive pharmaceutical distribution network. India is at an early stage of brand-building. (Ongoing, referenced across multiple annual reports)

• E-commerce channel growth: Online pharmacy and e-commerce channels are growing at 8.4% CAGR globally. Haw Par has been expanding its online presence, which reduces dependence on physical retail distribution. (FY2024 Annual Report)

8. Key Risks

1. US Tariff Exposure (High Probability, Moderate Impact)

All Tiger Balm products sold in the US are manufactured at the Xiamen, China factory. With US tariffs on Chinese goods at 145%, the sole US distributor (Prince of Peace Enterprises) faces US$3-5 million in annual tariff costs on approximately US$30 million of US sales. As of mid-2025, the distributor had not raised retail prices, absorbing the cost themselves. Big-box retailers require 90 days' notice for price changes, creating a structural lag. If tariffs persist at current levels and prices cannot be raised without destroying demand, the US market could become uneconomic. The US is a growing but still relatively small market for Tiger Balm - the risk is not existential but it constrains a growth opportunity.

2. Concentration in UOB/UOL Investments (Low Probability, Catastrophic Impact)

Approximately 65% of Haw Par's pre-tax profit comes from dividends on UOB and UOL shares. Haw Par does not control these companies and has no influence over their dividend policies. If UOB were to cut its dividend significantly - due to a banking crisis, regulatory capital requirements, or economic downturn in Southeast Asia - Haw Par's reported profits would fall dramatically even if Tiger Balm continued performing well. The 2020 COVID-19 period, when MAS capped Singapore bank dividends, demonstrated this vulnerability.

3. Family Succession and Governance (Medium Probability, Medium Impact)

Wee Cho Yaw, the patriarch who controlled Haw Par for 46 years, passed away on 3 February 2024 at age 95. His estate, worth approximately US$10 billion, is being distributed among three sons and two daughters. Wee Ee Chao (eldest son, Chairman of UOB Kay Hian) became Haw Par's Chairman. Wee Ee Lim (youngest son) remains CEO. While the transition appears orderly, generational wealth transfers in Asian family conglomerates can produce disagreements about capital allocation, dividend policy, and strategic direction. The three brothers collectively hold overlapping but not identical interests across UOB, UOL, Haw Par, and other family entities.

4. Capital Misallocation (Medium Probability, Medium Impact)

Haw Par sits on approximately S$730 million in net cash with minimal debt. Management has historically been conservative with this cash, preferring to accumulate rather than deploy aggressively. However, the Hua Han precedent is cautionary: in 2005, Haw Par invested approximately S$47 million in Hua Han Bio-Pharmaceutical, a Hong Kong-listed Chinese pharma company. By 2016, short sellers (Emerson Analytics, Zhongkui Research) exposed accounting fraud at Hua Han, alleging inflated revenue and overstated assets. Trading was suspended in September 2016, and in December 2019 the Hong Kong High Court ordered Hua Han's liquidation. Haw Par's investment was effectively a total loss. If management deploys its cash pile into another value-destructive acquisition, minority shareholders bear the consequences.

5. Persistent Discount to NAV (Structural Risk)

Haw Par has traded at a persistent discount to its net asset value for decades. The combined value of its UOB shares, UOL shares, cash, properties, and Tiger Balm business exceeds the company's market capitalization by a wide margin. This discount exists because minority shareholders have no mechanism to force value realization - the controlling Wee family benefits from the cross-holding structure and has no incentive to sell UOB/UOL shares, pay special dividends, or break up the company. This is not a risk that something bad will happen - it is the risk that something good will not happen.

6. Competitive Displacement in Western Markets (Low Probability, Low Impact)

Tiger Balm faces increasing competition from pharmacologically superior products (Voltaren/diclofenac) and better-marketed alternatives (Icy Hot, Salonpas) in Western markets. If consumer preference shifts toward evidence-based products and away from traditional remedies, Tiger Balm's growth in the US and Europe could stall.

9. Walk the Talk

Disclosure: Haw Par does not conduct quarterly earnings conference calls. This assessment is based on management's public statements in Annual Reports (FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, FY2025), H1 2025 half-yearly results, and AGM responses to shareholders (April 2025 and April 2026). The most recent disclosure is the FY2025 Annual Report published April 2026 and the AGM 2026 responses dated 17 April 2026.

Haw Par's management team - CEO Wee Ee Lim has led the company since 2003 - communicates in a style best described as profoundly conservative. Annual report chairman's statements and management discussions are brief, factual, and almost aggressively un-promotional. There is no forward guidance, no earnings targets, no promises of transformational growth. This makes "walk the talk" assessment unusual: there are very few explicit promises to track.

What management has consistently communicated is a commitment to steady growth in the Tiger Balm brand, prudent investment of the balance sheet, and progressive dividend increases as earnings allow. Against these broad commitments, the track record is credible:

Dividend progression: Management increased the regular dividend from S$0.30 per share (FY2021-2022) to S$0.40 per share (FY2023-2025), a 33% increase aligned with the recovery in earnings from pandemic lows. In May 2025, the company paid a S$1.00 per share special dividend (for FY2024), the first special dividend in recent memory. This was widely interpreted as linked to the estate distribution following Wee Cho Yaw's passing, but regardless of motivation, it demonstrated willingness to return excess capital.

Healthcare growth: Management stated in the FY2023 Annual Report that Tiger Balm was experiencing "strong demand in ASEAN, Europe, and other regions." FY2024 delivered: healthcare revenue rose 6% to S$226 million, with particular strength in ASEAN and Europe, exactly as stated. FY2025 continued the trend with group revenue reported at S$230 million and H1 2025 showing 7% top-line growth.

Malaysia plant expansion: The FY2024 Annual Report disclosed plans to expand production capacity in Malaysia starting 2025. The FY2025 Annual Report confirmed the new plant was commissioning as planned. This is a modest capital project, not a transformational bet, but it was delivered on the stated timeline.

Property challenges acknowledged: Management has consistently flagged that Menara Haw Par in KL faces occupancy headwinds due to office oversupply. This was not hidden or spun - it was stated plainly across multiple annual reports. The situation has not improved, but management did not promise it would.

What has been quietly dropped: Management mentioned plans for "new product variations to appeal to the new generation of users" in FY2024 disclosures. There has been no specific announcement of what these products are, when they launch, or how they will be marketed. This remains a vague aspiration rather than a concrete deliverable.

Assessment: This is a management team that underpromises and delivers steadily. There are no spectacular wins to celebrate and no missed targets to call out - because targets are rarely set publicly. The Wee family runs Haw Par like a family trust: conservatively, quietly, with no interest in impressing capital markets. For shareholders who want predictability and incremental improvement, this is reassuring. For shareholders who want value creation through bold strategic moves, it is frustrating.

10. Shareholder Friendliness Index

Dividends: DPS was S$0.30 in FY2021 and FY2022, increased to S$0.40 in FY2023 and maintained at S$0.40 for FY2024 and FY2025 - a 33% step-up in the regular dividend. Additionally, a S$1.00 per share special dividend was paid in May 2025 (for FY2024), bringing total FY2024 distributions to S$1.40 per share. The payout ratio on the regular S$0.40 dividend is approximately 33%, leaving substantial room for continued payment even in a downturn.

Buybacks and Dilution: Haw Par has not conducted meaningful share buybacks in recent years. Shares outstanding have remained flat at approximately 221 million shares, with no dilution from equity compensation. The company accumulates cash (net cash of approximately S$730 million as of FY2025) rather than buying back shares, despite trading at a persistent discount to NAV.

Verdict: Neutral - The progressive regular dividend and one-time special dividend demonstrate willingness to return some capital, but the refusal to buy back shares at a significant discount to asset value, combined with hoarding over S$700 million in cash, prevents a "Returns Capital" classification. The single most important reason: the controlling family's interest in preserving cross-holding structures overrides any incentive to maximise minority shareholder returns.

11. Insider Activities

Source: SGXNet filings for Haw Par Corporation Limited (H02.SI), 2025-2026.

Recent Transactions

The most significant insider activity in the past 12 months was not open-market buying or selling but rather estate-related transfers following the death of patriarch Wee Cho Yaw on 3 February 2024:

• 7 March 2025 - Wee Ee Lim (CEO and Executive Director) received 1.64 million Haw Par shares transferred from the estate of the late Wee Cho Yaw. Following this transfer, Wee Ee Lim holds a total interest of 77,218,669 shares (34.88%), comprising 573,738 shares directly and 76,644,931 shares through deemed interests via family investment vehicles including C.Y. Wee & Company Private Limited. (SGXNet Change in Interest of Director/CEO, 7 March 2025)

• 21 January 2026 - A further notification related to changes in substantial shareholder interests was filed, likely reflecting continued estate distribution among the Wee family heirs (three sons and two daughters). (SGXNet Disclosure of Interest - Substantial Shareholder, 21 January 2026)

No Open-Market Transactions Identified

A search of SGXNet filings for Haw Par in 2025-2026 did not identify any open-market purchases or sales by directors or the CEO. The transactions disclosed are exclusively estate-related transfers, not voluntary buy/sell decisions.

Net Assessment

The insider activity picture for Haw Par is dominated by estate administration rather than conviction signals. There is no open-market buying, which would be the strongest signal of insider confidence, and no open-market selling, which would be a concern. The Wee family's interests are concentrated (Wee Ee Lim at 34.88%, Wee Ee Chao at 34.01%) and these stakes have been held for decades, not accumulated recently.

Signal: Neutral. The absence of open-market transactions in either direction is consistent with a family that treats its Haw Par holding as a permanent asset, not a tradeable position. The estate transfers are mechanical, not informational. There is no bullish or bearish signal to extract from the insider activity.

12. Scenarios

Bull Case

The new Malaysia plant comes online smoothly and by 2028 Haw Par has meaningfully expanded its production capacity, driving down per-unit costs and enabling supply to meet growing demand across ASEAN and Europe. Tiger Balm's push into new product formats - patches, sprays, creams - resonates with younger consumers who appreciate the brand but want modern delivery mechanisms. The India partnership with Alkem begins to gain real traction, with Tiger Balm becoming a recognizable brand in Indian pharmacies. European distribution deepens, and Tiger Balm moves from ethnic grocery stores to mainstream pharmacy chains across Germany, France, and the UK. US tariffs are eventually reduced or the company shifts US-bound production from China to Malaysia, solving the tariff problem while maintaining cost efficiency.

On the investment side, UOB continues its expansion across Southeast Asia, benefiting from rising financial inclusion and ASEAN economic integration. UOB's dividend grows steadily, pushing Haw Par's total income higher. The new generation of Wee family leadership - perhaps prompted by minority shareholder pressure or simply by different priorities than their father - begins returning more cash to shareholders through higher regular dividends or a formal buyback program. The discount to NAV narrows modestly, not because anything dramatic happens but because the market gradually recognizes that this is a predictable, dividend-growing, asset-rich company with minimal downside.

Base Case

Tiger Balm continues growing at its long-run trend rate of 6-8% annually, driven by steady demand in Asia and incremental expansion in Western markets. The Malaysia plant adds capacity but does not transform the business. New product launches happen at an evolutionary pace - a reformulated cream here, a new patch size there - without any breakout hit that changes the growth trajectory. The US tariff situation remains a drag on US margins but does not kill the market entirely; some price increases are passed through, volume dips slightly, and the US remains a small but stable contributor.

UOB delivers consistent dividend income. The Wee family maintains its conservative stewardship - no bold acquisitions, no dramatic capital returns, no changes to the cross-holding structure. The regular dividend stays at S$0.40 or edges up to S$0.45-0.50 over the next few years as healthcare earnings grow. The discount to NAV persists because the structural reasons for it (family control, circular holdings) are unchanged. Haw Par remains what it has been for decades: a quiet, predictable, asset-rich company that generates a 3-4% dividend yield and grows its underlying business at a mid-single-digit rate.

Bear Case

The US tariff wall makes the Chinese factory uneconomic for US-bound production, and Prince of Peace Enterprises either drastically reduces orders or exits the distribution agreement. Shifting production to Malaysia or Singapore for US supply requires years and additional capital expenditure. Meanwhile, Tiger Balm's core ASEAN markets face a sustained economic slowdown - perhaps triggered by a Chinese property crisis that drags down the entire region. Tourism weakens, consumer spending contracts, and Tiger Balm's revenue in its largest market stalls.

More troublingly, the new generation of Wee family leadership makes a large, value-destructive acquisition with the S$730 million cash pile - a repeat of the Hua Han debacle but at a larger scale. Or the family begins quarrelling over the estate, leading to governance paralysis. UOB faces a banking crisis or regulatory capital call that forces a dividend cut, slashing Haw Par's reported income. The persistent discount to NAV widens further as investors lose patience with a company that accumulates cash but refuses to buy back shares, sits on billions of UOB stock but does nothing with it, and grows its operating business at a pace that excites no one. Haw Par becomes the textbook example of a company that is cheap for a reason, and the reason does not change.

Sources:

• Haw Par Corporation - Investor Relations
• Haw Par Corporation Annual Report 2025 (PDF)
• Haw Par Corporation - Wikipedia
• Haw Par Corporation - SGX Financials
• Haw Par Corporation - Dividend History
• Tiger Balm Products (US)
• Haw Par Corporation - Slow Turtle Analysis
• Dr Wealth - Wee Cho Yaw's Business Empire
• Value Invest Asia - 8 Key Things About Haw Par
• The Edge Singapore - Wee Ee Lim Estate Shares
• NBC News - Tiger Balm Tariff Impact
• Mordor Intelligence - Topical Analgesic Market
• Coherent Market Insights - Topical Analgesic Market