Olam Group Limited (SGX: VC2) - Deep Dive Research Report

Prepared: May 4, 2026 | Research Analyst Report

Four Concalls Used in This Report

Section 1: What the Company Does

The Simple Version, Then the Complicated Truth

Olam Group sources raw agricultural commodities - cocoa beans in Ivory Coast, coffee cherries in Ethiopia, almonds in California, spices in India - and transforms them into food ingredients that companies like Nestle, Mars, Mondelez, and Unilever use to make the products on supermarket shelves. If you've eaten a chocolate bar, drunk instant coffee, added pepper to your food, or consumed a dairy product, there is a meaningful chance ofi (the Olam Food Ingredients division) sat somewhere in that supply chain.

But understanding what Olam Group actually is in May 2026 requires understanding what it is becoming, because the company that files annual reports today is not the company that filed them in 2020. It is a business in the final stages of dismembering itself into pieces.

The Founding and Evolution

Olam was born in 1989 in Lagos, Nigeria. The Kewalram Chanrai Group - a trading family of Indian origin with deep roots in West Africa - created it as a vehicle to export non-oil commodities from Nigeria and generate foreign exchange. The initial product was cashews. The model was simple: go where others don't bother to go, build relationships with farmers and village cooperatives in remote origins, aggregate supply, and sell to processors elsewhere.

Sunny Verghese joined as the third employee and became CEO in the early 1990s. He transformed what could have been a niche West African exporter into a vertically integrated global agri-business. The intellectual pivot he made was recognizing that the real value wasn't just in buying and selling commodities - it was in owning the origination infrastructure in frontier markets and then pushing downstream into processing. Competitors like Cargill and ADM had scale but were often reluctant to invest in the farm-gate infrastructure in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, or Cameroon. Olam went there and stayed.

By 1995, Olam incorporated in Singapore and relocated its headquarters, accepting the Singapore government's invitation with a concessional tax rate as an "Approved International Trader." By 2003, Temasek Holdings and the International Finance Corporation had taken stakes - institutional validation of a model that was working. The 2005 SGX IPO brought public capital. In 2015, Mitsubishi Corporation acquired a 20% stake for strategic reasons - the Japanese trading house wanted a direct stake in global agricultural supply chains.

By 2019, Olam had grown into a company with operations in 60 countries, 82,000 employees, and revenues approaching S$50 billion. It also had a sprawling portfolio that made it extremely difficult to explain to investors: cocoa processing in Ivory Coast sat alongside rice milling in Nigeria, rubber plantations in Gabon, a digital farming platform in India, commodity financial services, and an IT shared services business. The conglomerate complexity discount was real and persistent.

The 2020 Restructuring - The Decision That Defines Everything Today

In 2020, Olam announced a fundamental reorganization. The company would split into three distinct entities:

1. ofi (Olam Food Ingredients): cocoa, coffee, dairy, nuts, spices - the premium, value-added food ingredients business targeting an IPO on the London Stock Exchange
2. Olam Agri: grains, rice, edible oils, cotton, animal feed, commodity services - the staples trading and processing business targeting a separate listing
3. Remaining Olam Group: everything else, including gestating businesses, digital platforms, logistics assets, and shared services - to be monetized over time

This was not a financial restructuring. It was a fundamental redefinition of what Olam was. Verghese's bet was that each business, in isolation, would be valued at a multiple more appropriate to its industry rather than the blended, discounted multiple of a holding company.

Where Things Stand in May 2026

Six years after announcing that restructuring, here is the current reality:

• Olam Agri sale completed April 27, 2026 - exactly one week before this report. Saudi Arabia's SALIC (Saudi Agriculture & Livestock Investment Company, a Public Investment Fund entity) acquired a 44.58% stake for US$1.88 billion. Olam Group retains 19.99%, with a put option to sell that remaining stake to SALIC at approximately US$800 million on the third anniversary of closing. The 100% equity valuation implied is US$4 billion.

• ofi IPO still pending - The London Stock Exchange listing, originally targeted for H1 2022, has been delayed repeatedly - first by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, then by volatile cocoa prices. The IPO or a strategic transaction remains the declared objective, but no timeline has been given.

• Mindsprint sold to Wipro - The IT services arm was sold for US$375 million in early April 2026, with an accompanying 8-year, US$1 billion+ services contract. Pending regulatory approvals, expected to close by June 2026.

• Sunny Verghese stepped down on April 27, 2026 - the co-founder who built the business over 35 years handed the reins to Shekhar Anantharaman (previously ofi CEO) as Executive Director.

What this means in practice: an investor buying Olam Group today is buying a holding company whose primary asset is ofi (the food ingredients business), a 19.99% stake in Olam Agri (with a defined floor exit), a collection of assets being systematically monetized, and an Wipro IT services deal that generates long-term cashflows. The company's strategic end-state - after all monetizations - will likely be a cleaned-up, standalone ofi eventually listed or sold.

The Core Value Proposition of ofi

ofi's fundamental proposition to customers is this: we sit at the origin, we control the supply chain back to the farm, and we can transform raw commodities into high-specification ingredients with consistent quality and full traceability. A chocolate manufacturer in Germany buying cocoa powder from ofi is not just buying a commodity - they are buying tested, certified, origin-traceable cocoa processed to their exact flavor and fat specifications, with supply assurance backed by physical infrastructure in origin countries that competitors cannot easily replicate.

The business took 35 years to build. The sourcing relationships with 2.8 million farmers across 48 countries, the physical infrastructure - 120+ manufacturing facilities, 19 innovation centers - and the technical expertise accumulated in each ingredient platform are not things a competitor can assemble in five years.

Section 2: Business Segments

2.1 ofi (Olam Food Ingredients) - The Core Engine

ofi is the business that Olam Group is organized around. After the Olam Agri divestment, it generates the overwhelming majority of continuing operations revenue. It operates across five ingredient platforms - cocoa, coffee, dairy, edible nuts, and spices - each with its own sourcing geography, customer base, and competitive dynamics.

What makes ofi unusual in the food ingredients industry is the combination of origin presence and downstream processing. Most ingredient companies are either traders (who buy and sell without processing) or processors (who buy raw materials but don't control the source). ofi does both, in every major ingredient category, at scale.

The business was created in 2020 as a formal legal entity when Olam announced its reorganization, but the underlying platforms have been built over 30+ years. The cocoa business traces its heritage to deZaan, a Dutch cocoa processor founded in 1911 on the Zaan River in the Netherlands. The coffee business has been built from direct farmer relationships in Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Central America. The nuts business came partly through acquisitions and partly through direct origination in California, India, and Vietnam. Each platform has distinct economics, different customers, and different competitive dynamics.

The Ingredients & Solutions sub-segment within ofi is strategically the most important. This is where ofi works directly with food and beverage manufacturers to develop custom formulations - a specific cocoa powder alkalized to a customer's exact color and flavor specification, or a nut butter developed in one of ofi's 19 innovation centers for a private label client. Ingredients & Solutions generates higher margins than pure commodity trading and creates switching costs because the formulations are customer-specific. In H1 2024, the Ingredients & Solutions segment grew 112.9% - nearly doubling in a single half-year period - reflecting both volume growth and price-driven revenue expansion from record cocoa prices.

Revenue scale: ofi generated S$28.5 billion in full-year 2025 revenue (continuing operations), representing 96%+ of Olam Group's continuing revenue. EBIT for FY2025 was S$1.07 billion, essentially flat year-on-year as cocoa price normalization squeezed margins after 2024's extraordinary run.

Competitive position: ofi holds top-three positions in cocoa, coffee, and spices globally, and is the world's largest originator and processor of edible nuts. These positions were built through decades of investment in origin infrastructure - not through acquisitions at a premium, but through patient capital deployment in markets where others saw operational risk rather than opportunity.

Strategic priority: ofi is the crown jewel. The entire reorganization plan is ultimately oriented around creating a clean, IPO-ready food ingredients company. The US$500 million capital injection Olam Group made into ofi in H1 2025 was explicitly to strengthen ofi's balance sheet ahead of an independent listing or strategic transaction.

2.2 Olam Agri (Discontinued Operations - Now Divested)

Understanding Olam Agri matters for understanding Olam Group's financial history, even though the business has now been sold. For the three years covered in this report's financial analysis, Olam Agri was half or more of total group revenue.

Olam Agri is a market-leading agri-business focused on food staples rather than premium ingredients. Its three core segments were: Food & Feed Origination & Merchandising (grains, oilseeds, rice, cotton - buying, trading, and shipping at scale); Food & Feed Processing & Value-Added (flour, pasta, fortified rice, animal feed - adding value through physical transformation); and Fibre, Agri-industrials & Ag Services (cotton, rubber, wood products, risk management, freight).

The business was built on a geographic advantage: decades of presence in Africa and Asia, where Olam Agri had on-the-ground relationships, physical infrastructure, and market knowledge that was genuinely difficult to replicate. It operated branded rice under labels like Royal Aroma and Mama Africa, ran wheat milling and pasta production in Africa, and offered risk management and freight services to agricultural producers and processors.

In FY2024, Olam Agri generated S$33.2 billion in revenue. After the April 2026 SALIC transaction, Olam Group retains only 19.99%. The S$1.88 billion cash inflow has already been received, and the S$800 million put option provides a defined floor on the remaining stake.

2.3 Remaining Olam Group / OGH (Olam Gestating Holdings)

This is the collection of assets that fit neither the premium food ingredients thesis of ofi nor the food staples model of Olam Agri. Some were bets on new growth platforms that didn't reach escape velocity. Others are infrastructure or resource assets that have real value but are outside Olam's strategic core. Management is systematically finding "long-term homes" for each.

Key assets being monetized:

• Olam Palm Gabon (OPG): A palm oil plantation in Gabon. This was originally conceived as a sustainable integrated farming model. It has faced scrutiny over deforestation concerns (documented by Mighty Earth) and remains a challenging asset to divest given ESG complexity.

• Rusmolco: Dairy farming in Russia - stranded by geopolitical constraints following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The asset was already challenging before 2022 and has become significantly more difficult to monetize since.

• ARISE P&L: African port and logistics infrastructure. Olam owns 32.4% and has agreed to sell this stake for US$175 million. This was expected to close in 2025 but remains in process. Updated: ARISE P&L sale was announced as completed in early 2026.

• Caraway: Specialty grains and food technology businesses.

• Mantra: Specialty dairy business.

• Olam Rubber Gabon: Natural rubber plantation in Gabon.

• Gabon Fertilizer Project: A downstream fertilizer processing project in Gabon, tied to the palm oil operations.

• Mindsprint: The IT services business, now being sold to Wipro for US$375 million with an 8-year managed services contract expected to exceed US$1 billion - an unusually creative divestment structure where the buyer of the asset also becomes a long-term service provider.

• Terrascope: An enterprise carbon measurement and ESG reporting platform. Being sold to XeleratedFifty1. This was Olam's bet on enterprise sustainability software - a promising concept that likely couldn't scale fast enough within Olam's portfolio.

• Jiva Ag: A digital farmer services platform in India. Olam closed this in 2025 - an admission that the digital agriculture platform model, while conceptually compelling, couldn't reach commercial viability.

In FY2025, the Remaining Olam Group swung to a positive EBIT of S$197.7 million from a loss of S$158.7 million in FY2024 - a positive swing of S$349.2 million. This dramatic improvement was driven by gains on asset sales and improved operational performance in the businesses being retained.

Segment comparison table:

Section 3: Products and Business Detail

ofi's Five Ingredient Platforms

Cocoa

The cocoa business is ofi's flagship. The heritage brand is deZaan, established in 1911 in the Netherlands - over a century of cocoa processing expertise in a single brand. ofi manufactures the full range of cocoa derivatives: cocoa powder, cocoa butter, cocoa liquor (also called cocoa mass), cocoa beans, and specialty fats including cocoa butter equivalents and substitutes.

The sourcing geography covers nine countries: Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana (the world's largest producers, together accounting for ~65% of global supply), Cameroon, Nigeria, Brazil, Ecuador, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia. ofi sources from approximately 550,000 farmers across these origins under its "Cocoa Compass" sustainability program. This on-the-ground presence at origin - physical buying stations, farmer relationship managers, quality testing labs - is what separates ofi from pure traders who simply buy on the commodity markets.

Processing happens at facilities across origin countries and destination markets. The manufacturing process for cocoa powder, for example, begins with fermented and dried beans that are cleaned, roasted, and then ground into cocoa liquor. The liquor is pressed to separate cocoa butter from the press cake, which is then pulverized into cocoa powder. Alkalization (a Dutch Process treatment with potassium carbonate) adjusts the pH, altering flavor, color, and solubility to customer specifications. Each customer often has a unique specification - a specific color value, a particular fat content, a defined flavor profile - that makes the product partially customized and thus less substitutable than it might appear.

ofi's brand portfolio within cocoa includes deZaan (premium Dutch-process powders), Unicao (West Africa), Joanes (Brazil), Macao (Spain), Huysman (USA/Indonesia), and Britannia Specialty Fats. The deZaan brand has recently launched single-origin cocoa liquors - a premium product targeting the craft chocolate sector, which commands significantly higher margins than commodity cocoa ingredients.

Coffee

ofi is the world's second-largest supplier of green (unroasted) coffee. The business spans origination in Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Vietnam, Colombia, Honduras, and Brazil, through to roasting and processing. Unlike cocoa, where ofi does the primary processing itself, much of the coffee business involves sourcing, quality-grading, and supplying green coffee to roasters like Nestle, JAB Holdings (Jacobs Douwe Egberts), and others.

However, ofi also operates in value-added coffee - soluble coffee (instant), coffee extracts, and specialty coffee preparations. These move up the value chain from pure green coffee trading. The coffee business experienced significant volatility in 2024-2025 as Arabica and Robusta prices hit multi-decade highs driven by drought in Brazil and Vietnam. This created a painful dynamic: ofi's customers tried to reduce volumes while raw material costs surged, compressing margins and inflating working capital requirements.

Edible Nuts

This is where ofi is genuinely the global market leader. The nuts platform spans multiple varieties: cashews, almonds, peanuts (groundnuts), hazelnuts, pistachios, macadamias, and pecans. Sourcing comes from Vietnam (cashews), West Africa (cashews, groundnuts), California (almonds, pistachios), Turkey (hazelnuts), Australia and South Africa (macadamias), and Mexico (pecans).

The value-added processing includes shelling, blanching, roasting, slicing, dicing, and creating nut butters, nut pastes, and nut flours for bakery, confectionery, and snack applications. The supply chain for nuts is more concentrated than cocoa or coffee - the almond market is essentially controlled by California production, and cashews are dominated by a handful of origin countries. ofi's long history in West African cashew origination gives it a structural sourcing advantage in that market.

Dairy

The dairy platform supplies milk powder, whey protein, butter, cheese, and dairy ingredients to food manufacturers globally. The business sources from Europe, Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), and increasingly from emerging markets. This is a more commoditized platform than cocoa or nuts, but it serves customers who want consolidated ingredient sourcing - a manufacturer who buys cocoa and coffee from ofi may prefer to also buy their dairy ingredients from the same supplier rather than maintaining separate supplier relationships.

Spices

Spices is the fifth platform: pepper, vanilla, turmeric, ginger, cumin, cardamom, and other botanicals. The business sources from Vietnam (pepper), Madagascar (vanilla), India (turmeric, cardamom), and various origins for others. Processing includes cleaning, grinding, blending, sterilization, and customer-specific formulations for industrial food manufacturers and foodservice operators.

Manufacturing Infrastructure

120+ manufacturing facilities across six continents, concentrated in origin countries (West Africa for cocoa, Vietnam for cashews, India for spices) and in destination markets (Netherlands, USA, UK for customer proximity). The 19 innovation centers are co-location sites where ofi's food scientists work alongside customer product development teams to create new formulations. These are strategically located in Amsterdam, Bangalore, Chicago, and Singapore to serve different customer markets.

The manufacturing process for most ofi products is capital-intensive - grinding mills, pressing equipment, spray dryers, extraction systems, roasting lines - and requires significant technical expertise to operate. The equipment is also commodity-specific. A cocoa pressing facility cannot easily be repurposed for coffee roasting. This creates some asset rigidity but also means that once built, these facilities represent genuine barriers to entry.

Section 4: Customers

Who Buys

ofi's 8,000+ customers span the full spectrum of food and beverage manufacturing. The largest customers are the major multinational food companies: Nestle (the world's largest food company), Mars (chocolate, petfood, food), Mondelez (Oreo, Cadbury, Toblerone), Unilever, Ferrero, Lindt, Hershey, and the major beverage companies. ofi also serves regional food manufacturers, private label operators, foodservice distributors, and artisan producers who value the traceability and quality consistency of ofi's supply chain.

Within each customer organization, purchasing decisions are typically made by a combination of the procurement team (who manage cost and supply continuity) and the product development or R&D team (who specify the technical requirements). The larger and more sophisticated the customer, the more complex this relationship becomes. A company like Nestle or Mars will have dedicated supplier management teams, annual contract negotiations, and detailed supplier audits. For these customers, ofi is not selling a spot commodity - it is selling an ongoing supply relationship with defined quality specifications, sustainability certifications, and price mechanisms.

Why They Buy From ofi

There are three distinct reasons customers choose ofi over alternatives:

First: Origin presence. If a chocolate manufacturer needs certified sustainable cocoa traceable to specific farms in Cote d'Ivoire, ofi can provide that because it operates directly in Cote d'Ivoire at the farm level. Smaller competitors either can't certify at scale or source through middlemen who break the traceability chain. This matters increasingly as EU deforestation regulations (the EU Deforestation Regulation, EUDR) require supply chain traceability going back to the specific plot of land where the commodity was grown.

Second: Integrated portfolio. A manufacturer who needs cocoa, coffee, nuts, and spices for a premium cereal bar can potentially source all four from ofi. This simplifies procurement, reduces supplier management complexity, and enables joint product development. ofi actively sells this integrated model to customers, and the Ingredients & Solutions business unit is essentially a co-development service that wraps around the raw ingredient supply.

Third: Processing capability and technical expertise. deZaan's century of cocoa processing knowledge means that when a chocolate maker asks for a cocoa powder that is a specific color, has a defined fat content, and behaves in a particular way when combined with sugar and milk in a specific temperature process, ofi can solve that problem. This is not a commodity transaction. The product exists because ofi's technical team created it.

Switching Costs

For commodity-grade ingredients (standard cocoa powder, green coffee), switching costs are moderate. A buyer can in principle switch to Barry Callebaut or Cargill with a qualification period of a few months and some reformulation testing.

For custom formulations - specialty products developed in ofi's innovation centers for specific customer applications - switching costs are real and meaningful. A customer who has spent 12-18 months co-developing a specific chocolate coating for a snack bar has a product that exists in part because of ofi's technical expertise. Reformulating with a competitor means starting that process again. The time cost, the risk of quality variation, and the relationship investment all create genuine stickiness.

For customers who have embedded ofi's sustainability programs into their own supply chain claims (Mars has a 15+ year partnership spanning regenerative cocoa programs in Ecuador), the switching cost extends to brand equity - abandoning an established sourcing partnership means abandoning the sustainability narrative built on top of it.

Concentration

ofi is not dependent on any single customer in a way that creates existential concentration risk. The 8,000+ customer count is deliberately diversified. That said, the top tier of Tier 1 global food manufacturers - perhaps 20-30 companies - likely represents a disproportionate share of ofi's volumes. This is structural across the food ingredients industry: the world's largest food companies consume the most ingredients, so serving them is essential even if no single one accounts for a dangerous share.

Contract structures are typically annual supply agreements with pricing tied to a commodity reference price (LME for cocoa, ICO for coffee) plus a processing premium. The processing premium reflects ofi's value-added work and is less volatile than the commodity component. Specialty and custom products may have longer-term fixed-price elements for the processing premium. Pure spot business exists but is a smaller portion of the mix.

Section 5: Competitive Landscape

Cocoa: A Three-Player Market

The industrial cocoa processing market is dominated by three players: Barry Callebaut (Switzerland), Cargill Cocoa (USA), and ofi. Together they process the majority of the world's cocoa beans.

Barry Callebaut is the undisputed leader. Their ingredients are present in approximately one in four chocolate products consumed globally. Barry Callebaut operates 66 production facilities in 26 countries and serves clients in over 138 countries through its Chocolate Academy centers. Their outsourced chocolate manufacturing model - where they make finished chocolate under contract for food brands that then focus on marketing - gives them a different and potentially more defensible position than ofi's ingredients-focused model. As of December 2025, Barry Callebaut is reportedly exploring separating its cocoa division from its chocolate business - a potential structural break that could create both an acquisition opportunity and increased competition if the separated entity seeks aggressive growth.

Cargill Cocoa is the other major competitor. Cargill's scale in agricultural trading gives it inherent sourcing advantages and balance sheet strength. Cargill expanded its cocoa processing facility in Gresik, Indonesia in 2024. Cargill has also been investing in cocoa alternatives - partnering with Voyage Foods to develop NextCoa, a cocoa-free chocolate alternative - reflecting a hedge against cocoa supply volatility that ofi has not explicitly pursued.

ofi competes primarily on origin depth, product range, and customer intimacy. In the markets where ofi has long-standing origin presence (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria), it has sourcing infrastructure that is genuinely competitive with or superior to Barry Callebaut's. The deZaan brand retains strong recognition among premium chocolatiers who value the Dutch-process heritage. Where ofi is potentially exposed is in sheer scale of finished chocolate manufacturing - Barry Callebaut's integrated model extends further downstream into finished chocolate, a territory ofi has not pursued.

Coffee: A Fragmented but Concentrated Market

Green coffee trading and processing is less concentrated than cocoa. The major players are:

• Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG): The world's largest green coffee trader, privately held, Hamburg-based. Extensive origin presence and trading scale.
• Ecom Agroindustrial: Another major private green coffee trader.
• Louis Dreyfus Company: The trading house with significant coffee exposure.
• ofi: #2 globally by volume in green coffee supply.

The competitive dynamic in coffee is different from cocoa because the processing step (roasting) is typically done by the brand owner (Nestle, JAB, etc.) rather than outsourced. ofi's edge is in origin quality and the growing soluble coffee and coffee extracts business, where ofi processes closer to the finished product.

Edible Nuts: ofi's Strongest Position

In edible nuts, ofi is the world leader in origination and processing. The competitive set is different: origin-specific processors (major California almond handlers, Vietnamese cashew processors), specialty food companies (Wonderful Company in almonds/pistachios), and smaller regional operators. No single competitor covers the full breadth of nut varieties that ofi processes. This breadth advantage - being able to supply multiple nut types from a single supplier relationship - is meaningful for global food manufacturers who prefer consolidated sourcing.

Barriers to Entry - The Real Answer

Barriers are high but not absolute. To replicate ofi's cocoa business from scratch would require:

• Decades of farmer relationship-building across West Africa and Asia
• Physical origination infrastructure: buying stations, warehouses, quality labs, in origin countries with complex regulatory and logistical environments
• Processing facilities in both origin and destination markets
• Technical expertise in specialized processing (fermentation management, alkalization, pressing, flavor development)
• Customer relationships with the procurement and R&D teams at major food companies
• Sustainability certifications (Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, EUDR compliance)

A well-capitalized competitor could attempt this. Barry Callebaut has done it in cocoa over decades. The practical barrier is time and the willingness to invest in frontier markets ahead of returns. Private equity cannot replicate it in a 5-year fund cycle. A corporate acquirer of ofi would pay a premium for exactly these assets rather than rebuild them.

The realistic new entrant risk is not a direct replication but a strategic shift: if consumers shifted significantly away from chocolate and toward cocoa alternatives (as rising cocoa prices have incentivized), the core cocoa platform faces structural rather than competitive risk.

Where ofi Is Strong and Exposed

Strong: Edible nuts (market leadership), cocoa origin sourcing depth in West Africa, multi-category breadth for consolidated sourcing, deZaan brand in premium cocoa, sustainability credentials.

Exposed: Finished chocolate manufacturing (Barry Callebaut territory), exposure to cocoa and coffee price cycles that distort financial results, European regulatory risk (EUDR compliance burden falls disproportionately on origin-present players), and the ongoing IPO uncertainty that leaves the company in a strategic holding pattern.

Section 6: Industry

What Drives Demand

The food ingredients market does not have a single demand driver - it moves with multiple overlapping forces:

Global food volume growth is the baseline. As the world's population grows and incomes rise in emerging markets, total food consumption increases. This directly drives demand for bulk ingredients. The correlation between GDP per capita and chocolate consumption (a key driver for cocoa) is well-established.

Premiumization is the structural trend that works in ofi's favor. As consumers shift toward better-for-you, clean-label, sustainably-sourced, and premium food products, food manufacturers respond by sourcing higher-quality ingredients from traceable supply chains. This drives demand for ofi's certified, origin-traceable products over generic commodity alternatives.

Regulatory requirements are becoming an increasingly powerful demand driver, particularly in Europe. The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) requires companies to demonstrate that commodities were not grown on deforested land. For cocoa and coffee - two of ofi's core categories - this creates a compliance requirement that effectively mandates the kind of supply chain traceability that ofi has spent decades building. Companies that cannot demonstrate compliance will lose access to EU markets. ofi's origin presence and farmer registration programs (Cocoa Compass covers 550,000+ farmers) position it favorably for EUDR compliance, while creating a meaningful barrier for competitors with less origin depth.

Plant-based and alternative proteins are a secondary driver for nuts and certain spice categories, as food manufacturers develop products that use nuts and legumes as protein sources.

Market Size

The global food ingredients market was valued at approximately USD 368 billion in 2025, projected to reach USD 562 billion by 2034 at a compound annual growth rate of approximately 4.8%. The cocoa ingredients sub-market specifically was USD 13.2 billion in 2024, projected to reach USD 20.7 billion by 2034.

The green coffee market and edible nuts markets are not easily segmentable from these numbers due to classification differences, but the combined addressable market for ofi's five platforms is well into the hundreds of billions of dollars - the question is not whether the market exists but what share ofi can sustainably capture at acceptable margins.

Supply Chain Position

ofi sits at the most operationally complex point in the agricultural supply chain: the interface between farm-level commodity origination and industrial-scale processing. This is a position that requires both upstream relationships (with farmers, cooperatives, governments in origin countries) and downstream commercial relationships (with R&D and procurement teams at major food companies). Very few companies do both credibly at scale. The major commodity trading houses (Cargill, Louis Dreyfus, ADM) tend to focus on the trading and logistics layer without ofi's depth in origin origination. The major food companies (Nestle, Mars) do some backward integration but generally prefer outsourcing.

Cyclicality

The food ingredients industry is moderately cyclical. The primary source of cyclicality for ofi is commodity price volatility in cocoa, coffee, and (to a lesser extent) nuts. When cocoa prices spiked to historical highs in 2023-2024 - driven by supply shocks in West Africa from El Nino weather patterns - ofi's revenue grew dramatically because it passes commodity prices through to customers. But working capital requirements also surged (more dollars tied up in inventory and receivables) and customer demand softened as brands tried to reduce volumes to manage their own cost inflation. The processing margin (the premium ofi earns over the raw commodity) is relatively more stable, but it does compress when customers have less flexibility in their procurement negotiations.

The 2024-2025 cocoa price spike was exceptional. Prices reached levels not seen in decades, driven by genuine supply shortages in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire caused by adverse weather and ageing tree stock. This created a challenging environment for ofi - record revenues but compressed margins and enormous working capital consumption. As cocoa prices normalized in 2025, the reverse happened: lower revenue but improved cash generation. ofi's FY2025 result - flat EBIT year-on-year despite cocoa normalization - suggests the underlying business held up reasonably well through the cycle.

Regulatory Environment

The EUDR is the most consequential near-term regulatory development. Mandatory due diligence on supply chain traceability back to the plot level for cocoa, coffee, cattle, soy, wood, palm oil, and rubber. Implementation has been delayed multiple times but is now expected to come into force in late 2025/2026 for large operators. ofi's investment in farmer registration systems (Cocoa Compass, Coffee LENS) and geo-referenced farm mapping positions it well for compliance. The compliance burden may also work as a competitive moat: smaller traders who haven't invested in origin traceability infrastructure will face either exclusion from EU markets or significant catch-up investment.

Section 7: Growth Triggers

All triggers sourced from earnings call materials (press releases, MD&As, webcast transcripts) from the four concalls listed above.

• ofi medium-term EBIT growth guidance of high single-digits, sustained across all four concalls. Management has maintained this guidance through cocoa price spikes, geopolitical turbulence, and corporate restructuring without revision. The medium-term volume guidance of low-to-mid single digit growth in total volume accompanies this. ofi CEO Shekhar noted at the H1 2025 concall (August 14, 2025) that the business "navigated turbulence through its integrated and diversified model" and maintained confidence in the medium-term trajectory. (H1 FY2024, H2 FY2024, H1 FY2025, H2 FY2025 - repeated all four concalls)

• ofi IPO or strategic transaction. The planned primary listing on the London Stock Exchange (with concurrent Singapore secondary listing) has been referenced in every concall. The H2 FY2024 concall (February 28, 2025) noted the company was "pursuing potential ofi IPO alongside strategic options review." Following the Olam Agri sale close, ofi is now the singular focus. A US$500 million capital injection into ofi was completed in H1 2025 specifically to strengthen the standalone balance sheet ahead of this event. No timeline has been given, but the April 2026 management restructuring - placing ofi CEO Shekhar as Executive Director of the parent - signals this is the primary remaining deliverable. (All four concalls)

• Olam Agri sale proceeds enabling balance sheet de-levering. At the H1 FY2025 concall (August 14, 2025), management stated the plan to use approximately US$2 billion of the Olam Agri sale proceeds to achieve "debt-free status for Remaining Olam Group." The FY2025 concall (February 27, 2026) confirmed that net gearing had already improved from 2.79x to 1.87x (adjusted net gearing from 0.68x to 0.58x) before the Tranche 1 proceeds. The de-leveraging trajectory materially improves ofi's standalone credit profile for a future IPO or sale. (H1 FY2025, H2 FY2025)

"Allocate approximately US$2 billion to de-lever and achieve debt-free status for Remaining Olam Group." - management commitment, H1 FY2025 concall, August 14, 2025

• Remaining Olam Group asset monetizations - 7 remaining assets to find "long-term homes." At the H2 FY2025 concall (February 27, 2026), management stated that in 2025 "three of the remaining 10 assets were sold or wound down, leaving seven." In 2026, the plan is to find "long-term homes for these 7 remaining businesses, with material progress expected." Individual transactions flagged: ARISE P&L (32.4% for US$175M), Mindsprint (US$375M to Wipro, since completed in April 2026), Terrascope (to XeleratedFifty1). (H2 FY2025)

• Stabilization of cocoa and coffee prices enabling margin normalization. The H2 FY2025 concall (February 27, 2026) noted that CFO Muthukumar cited "cocoa prices normalised, enabling the Group to strengthen its overall cash flow position." ofi's FY2025 free cash flow turned positive at S$359.6 million compared to negative S$5.9 billion in FY2024 - the single largest year-on-year cash flow improvement in the company's history. If cocoa and coffee remain off peak-price levels, ofi's working capital requirements normalize and cash conversion improves significantly. (H2 FY2025)

• EU Deforestation Regulation compliance creating structural sourcing advantage. Not explicitly stated as a "growth trigger" in any single concall but consistently referenced in sustainability commentary as a driver of customer demand for ofi's traceable supply chains. The EUDR's implementation effectively converts ofi's origin investment from a cost center into a competitive advantage as less-invested competitors scramble for compliance.

• Shekhar Anantharaman's appointment as Executive Director, creating ofi-first organizational focus. At the H2 FY2025 concall (February 27, 2026), management flagged that Shekhar joining the Olam Group board would help ensure ofi's interests are directly represented in group-level capital allocation decisions. Post-Agri divestiture, the corporate center has reduced complexity and ofi will no longer compete for capital against an unrelated staples trading business. (H2 FY2025)

Trigger Summary Table:

Section 8: Key Risks

Risk 1: Commodity Price Volatility - A Structural Business Challenge

The mechanism: ofi passes through commodity prices to customers, so revenue tracks cocoa and coffee prices upward. But when prices spike, three things happen simultaneously and in ways that compound each other. First, customer demand softens as brands reduce volumes to manage their own cost pressures. Second, working capital requirements surge because ofi is holding more valuable inventory. Third, borrowing costs increase because the commodity inventory serving as collateral is worth more but the underlying business cash flows are under pressure. The FY2024 situation illustrated this clearly: EBIT grew 9.2% at the group level but PATMI fell 69% because finance costs surged on the back of cocoa and coffee inventory financing requirements. Net gearing moved from 1.73x to 2.79x in a single year. ofi's processing premium (the value-added margin) is relatively stable, but it can be temporarily obscured by commodity price dynamics that distort both revenue and working capital.

This is a high-probability moderate risk, not a low-probability catastrophic one. Commodity cycles are inherent to the business. The risk is not that commodity prices move - it is that an extended period of high prices (like 2023-2025) creates financial statement volatility that makes the business harder for investors to value and harder for management to plan around.

Risk 2: ofi IPO or Strategic Transaction Failure - The Central Value Unlock at Risk

The entire Olam Group reorganization thesis depends on successfully realizing value from ofi through an IPO or a sale to a strategic buyer. The original target was H1 2022. It is now mid-2026 and no transaction has occurred. Each delay has been attributed to external factors (Ukraine war, cocoa price volatility, market conditions), and management has maintained that the IPO remains the goal.

The mechanism by which this risk bites: if the ofi IPO fails to happen or happens at a disappointing valuation - because London Stock Exchange appetites for food ingredient companies have shifted, because ofi's financial results during the volatile cocoa cycle have been messy, or because the reorganization process itself has taken too long and value has been extracted in costs rather than created - then the core thesis of the Olam restructuring is partially invalidated. Olam Group shareholders would then hold a 100% stake in an unlisted food ingredients company with no clear path to value realization.

This is a moderate-probability significant risk. The longer the IPO is delayed, the more relevant this risk becomes.

Risk 3: EUDR Compliance Burden and Execution

The EU Deforestation Regulation requires companies importing cocoa, coffee, and other commodities into the EU to demonstrate these were not sourced from deforested land after December 31, 2020. The regulation comes with significant compliance infrastructure requirements: geo-referencing of every farm plot, data collection and verification at scale, legal liability for non-compliance.

ofi is better positioned than most competitors given its existing investment in the Cocoa Compass program and Coffee LENS systems. But EUDR compliance at the scale ofi operates is not a solved problem. Mistakes in data collection, gaps in farm coverage, or political instability in origin countries that disrupts verification could result in product being barred from EU markets. The EU is ofi's most important destination market for cocoa and coffee processing.

The mechanism: if ofi cannot demonstrate EUDR compliance for a portion of its cocoa supply, it either sells that supply to non-EU markets at potentially lower prices, or absorbs the cost of upgrading compliance infrastructure faster than planned. Neither outcome is catastrophic, but both would compress margins and require management attention during a period already demanding significant bandwidth from the reorganization.

Risk 4: Leadership Transition During Execution-Critical Period

Sunny Verghese co-founded Olam in 1989 and was the company's face, intellectual framework, and external credibility for 35 years. He stepped down on April 27, 2026, simultaneous with the CFO, in the same week as the Olam Agri transaction close. The incoming Executive Director (Shekhar Anantharaman) is a known internal leader with a strong track record at ofi - the 29% EBIT growth ofi delivered in FY2024 happened under his leadership. But the institutional knowledge, banking relationships, regulatory relationships, and investor confidence that Verghese carried cannot be transferred on a single day.

The mechanism: transitions in leadership that coincide with complex transactions (completing the Agri sale, pursuing Mindsprint and other asset sales, setting up an ofi IPO) create execution risk. Decisions that Verghese would have made quickly and confidently on the basis of 35 years of judgment now require consensus-building in a newly constituted leadership team. External parties - investment banks, government counterparts, major customers - may seek to renegotiate terms or slow decisions while the new leadership establishes itself.

This is a moderate-probability moderate-impact risk. Shekhar is capable, the team around him knows the business, and the reorganization has sufficient momentum. But the risk of execution slippage is real.

Risk 5: Geopolitical and Country Risk in Origin Operations

ofi's competitive advantage depends on operating in politically and logistically complex markets: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Vietnam, India. The West African cocoa belt has experienced periodic political instability, currency crises, and regulatory changes (like the 2022 Ghana forward sales crisis that disrupted cocoa exports). Russia's invasion of Ukraine has made Rusmolco effectively stranded. Gabon's political situation has complicated the OPG palm oil operations.

The mechanism: sudden regulatory changes, currency devaluations, political upheaval, or export bans in key origin countries can disrupt ofi's sourcing at short notice. While the diversified geography across nine cocoa origins provides some natural hedging, the supply of cocoa beans is highly concentrated in West Africa - if both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana are simultaneously disrupted (as they were by weather in 2023-2024), the entire cocoa supply chain tightens regardless of origin diversification.

Risk 6: Sustainability and ESG Litigation Risk

Olam's history includes documented controversies: deforestation in Gabon (palm oil, rubber), child labor in cocoa supply chains (class action lawsuit filed in 2021 naming Olam), and forced land displacement in Laos for coffee plantations. The 2012 Muddy Waters short-seller attack, while ultimately unsuccessful, demonstrated that Olam's complex financial structure and frontier market operations are vulnerable to reputational challenges.

The mechanism: an escalating child labor class action, a major regulatory enforcement action under EUDR, or a documented deforestation incident could create reputational damage with key customers (Mars, Nestle, and other major buyers have explicit sustainability sourcing commitments) and potentially trigger customer relationship reviews. The severity depends on the specific incident and how management responds.

Section 9: Walk the Talk

The Four Concalls

Before analyzing management credibility, confirming the four dates used:

• H1 FY2024 concall: August 14, 2024
• H2 FY2024 (Full Year 2024) concall: February 28, 2025
• H1 FY2025 concall: August 14, 2025
• H2 FY2025 (Full Year 2025) concall: February 27, 2026 - within 90 days of today (May 4, 2026).

The Oldest First: H1 FY2024 (August 14, 2024)

At the August 2024 concall, management was navigating two simultaneous challenges: record-high cocoa and coffee prices inflating working capital and finance costs, and the ongoing reorganization process. The financial results were mixed in presentation - EBIT grew 8.3% but PATMI was flat because finance costs surged. The declared position on strategy was consistent: maintain the reorganization plan (separate ofi and Olam Agri), pursue the ofi IPO alongside strategic alternatives, and continue the SALIC partnership with Olam Agri.

Management maintained ofi's medium-term guidance of high single-digit adjusted EBIT growth despite near-term commodity price disruption. They acknowledged that H2 2024 would remain challenging but expressed confidence in the trajectory. The CFO specifically flagged that the surge in working capital was driven by commodity prices, not operational deterioration - a distinction that proved correct.

What management guided here: the difficult commodity environment was temporary, ofi's underlying performance was solid, and the reorganization would advance. They did not lower ofi's medium-term guidance despite the pressure.

The Second Concall: H2 FY2024 (February 28, 2025)

The full-year 2024 results were a credibility test. Management had said H2 2024 would remain difficult - it was. PATMI for the full year fell 69% as finance costs surged. But EBIT grew 9.2%, roughly in line with guidance. More importantly, ofi specifically delivered a 29.1% EBIT increase for FY2024 - significantly exceeding the "high single-digit" guidance that had been maintained throughout the volatile year.

This overdelivery was notable. Management did not revise the guidance upward. They kept it at "high single-digit" going forward, suggesting deliberate conservatism rather than opportunistic guidance-raising. The cynical reading is that they lowballed; the charitable reading is that they understood the exceptional commodity price environment was not a sustainable baseline.

The bigger announcement at this concall was the SALIC transaction: Olam Group would sell 44.58% of Olam Agri to SALIC for approximately US$1.78 billion (the final closing value was US$1.88 billion after adjustments). This was a significant strategic milestone that management had been working toward for years. The announcement was concrete with specific valuations, structure, and terms - not aspirational.

Management promised: ofi IPO pursuit alongside strategic options, Remaining Olam Group losses to "narrow," and the SALIC deal to progress toward closing.

The Third Concall: H1 FY2025 (August 14, 2025)

At the August 2025 concall, management could report significant execution progress. The SALIC deal had received shareholder approval on July 4, 2025. ofi's EBIT grew 12.7% in H1 2025 - still within the high single-digit guidance range on an annualized basis. Most dramatically, the Remaining Olam Group had swung from a loss to a profit of S$172.9 million - a massive positive surprise against the prior-year loss of S$99.5 million. This swing was driven by the progress on asset monetizations and improved operational performance.

The US$500 million capital injection into ofi was confirmed as completed at end-June 2025. The ofi standalone balance sheet was now stronger ahead of any future listing. The interim dividend was cut to 2.0 cents from 3.0 cents - management framed this as capital being directed toward the reorganization rather than distributed, but it was still a 33% cut to the shareholder distribution.

On SALIC's final regulatory approval, management said they expected the final jurisdiction's approval "in the near term" without specifying when. At the February 2026 concall, they would specify March 2026.

The promise to "narrow losses" in the Remaining Olam Group was not just kept - it was dramatically exceeded. The swing from -S$99.5M to +S$172.9M in a single year represented genuine execution rather than trend-following.

The Fourth Concall: H2 FY2025 (February 27, 2026)

The February 2026 concall brought the most important news. ofi's full-year EBIT was flat at S$1.07 billion - the first time in recent memory that ofi had not delivered the "high single-digit" EBIT growth that management had consistently guided. The CFO attributed this to cocoa price normalization compressing the pass-through revenue, while underlying processing margin trends were intact. This is a plausible explanation but it is still a miss against guidance - management committed to "high single-digit" and delivered flat.

The good news: free cash flow turned dramatically positive (S$359.6 million vs -S$5.9 billion the prior year), net gearing improved from 2.79x to 1.87x, and the Remaining Olam Group delivered a full-year positive EBIT of S$197.7 million (vs a -S$158.7 million loss in FY2024). The balance sheet transformation was real and material.

On the SALIC timeline, management said the final jurisdiction's approval was expected "by the close of March 2026." The actual close was April 27, 2026 - about a month late. Not a large slip, but they missed the March guidance.

"We delivered strong PATMI growth on the back of operating profit growth in 2025 despite elevated market uncertainties." - CEO Sunny Verghese, H2 FY2025 concall, February 27, 2026

Verghese also announced that he would step down at the April 27 AGM - a commitment he kept to the day.

Overall Assessment

Olam Group's management is broadly credible but should be read with nuance. On the big strategic picture - the reorganization, the SALIC deal structure, the de-leveraging trajectory - they have executed approximately as guided, often on challenging timelines with significant external headwinds. The SALIC deal valuation was essentially as announced, the capital injection into ofi happened as committed, and the Remaining Olam Group turned from a loss to a profit on schedule.

Where management has been less precise: the ofi IPO timeline, which has been repeatedly deferred since the original H1 2022 target without a concrete revised date; and the FY2025 ofi EBIT miss against the medium-term guidance. On the IPO deferrals, external market factors were genuinely disrupting (Ukraine invasion, cocoa price volatility), and management avoided making a specific promise they couldn't keep. On the EBIT miss, the explanation is mechanically reasonable but the guidance was not adjusted to reflect the reality that a commodity-exposed business will have volatile years.

The management communication style is information-rich but occasionally optimistic on timelines for complex transactions. Investors who have tracked the ofi IPO since 2021 will have noticed this pattern.

Section 10: Shareholder Friendliness Index

Dividend History (FY2022 - FY2025)

FY2022: Total dividend of 8.5 Singapore cents per share. This represented the peak of Olam Group's dividend per share in the post-restructuring period. Split between an interim and final component.

FY2023: Total dividend of 7.0 Singapore cents per share (final dividend of 4.0 cents + interim of 3.0 cents). The 2023 result press release explicitly linked this to the launch of a share buyback program: "Olam Group H2 2023 PATMI up 15.5%; launches share buyback and recommends final dividend of 4.0 cents per share." The reduction from 8.5 cents to 7.0 cents represented a 17.6% cut.

FY2024: Total dividend of 6.0 Singapore cents per share (interim 3.0 cents + final 3.0 cents). A further reduction of 14.3% from FY2023. Management framed the reduction as consistent with capital allocation priorities during the reorganization and working capital pressures.

FY2025: Total dividend of 2.0 Singapore cents per share (interim only, paid August 2025). No final dividend was recommended. A further reduction of 67% from FY2024. This is the most dramatic single-year reduction in recent history. Management's rationale: capital is being returned via the Olam Agri sale proceeds rather than recurring dividends, and ofi needs a strengthened balance sheet ahead of its eventual IPO or sale.

Three-Year Trend: From 8.5 cents (FY2022) to 2.0 cents (FY2025) is a 76% decline over three years. The absolute per-share income for a shareholder holding Olam Group has fallen dramatically. The justification - that the Olam Agri sale return of US$1.88 billion (Tranche 1) represents a much larger capital return than dividends would have provided - is mathematically reasonable but it came in the form of debt reduction and balance sheet improvement rather than direct cash distribution to shareholders. The put option on the remaining 19.99% Olam Agri stake (worth approximately US$800 million in 3 years) represents a future shareholder return that is not yet realized.

Source: Olam Group investor relations, Dividends page; FY2025 press release (February 27, 2026).

Share Buybacks

FY2023: Launched the share buyback program in H2 2023 with a mandate to repurchase up to 5% of outstanding shares. This was the first formal buyback program in Olam Group's recent history.

H1 FY2024 (per August 2024 concall): Completed repurchase of 25.1 million shares for S$28.5 million (approximately S$1.13/share average). The mandate was renewed at the April 2024 AGM for up to 5% of outstanding shares.

FY2025: Repurchased approximately 22.2 million shares for S$20.7 million (approximately S$0.93/share average). The pace of buybacks was maintained despite the reorganization demands on capital.

Net Share Count Assessment: Buybacks totaling approximately 47.3 million shares over the FY2024-FY2025 period partially offset any dilution from employee share schemes. The total shares outstanding as of 2026 should be modestly lower than at the beginning of FY2024, but specific reconciliation data was not available in the sources consulted. Buyback volumes represent a small percentage of the approximately 3.75 billion shares outstanding.

Overall Assessment: The dividend trajectory is clearly unfriendly to shareholders who rely on income, falling 76% over three years. The strategic justification - de-leveraging and reorganization capital requirements - is coherent, but it asks shareholders to accept reduced income today in exchange for future value realization through the ofi IPO and remaining asset sales. That trade is rational if executed; it is a credibility-dependent promise if not. The buyback program is a modest offset - at S$20-28 million per year, it returns far less capital than the dividend reduction removes. Shareholders depending on Olam Group for income have been significantly disappointed.

Section 11: Scenarios

Bull Case

Olam Group's reorganization, which has consumed management bandwidth for six years, finally completes cleanly and at valuations that reward patience. The remaining Olam Agri stake is sold via the put option at approximately US$800 million in three years, providing another material capital return. The Mindsprint sale to Wipro closes without complication by mid-2026, adding US$375 million of cash. The remaining seven OGH assets find buyers - perhaps not at dream prices, but at values that mean the reorganization broadly achieves what it promised.

ofi, cleaned up and with a strengthened balance sheet after the US$500 million injection, proceeds to an IPO on the London Stock Exchange in 2027 or is acquired by a strategic buyer (a major food company seeking to build an integrated supply chain, or a private equity firm building an ingredient platform). The ofi IPO or sale crystallizes the value of what Olam has been building for 35 years at a multiple appropriate to a premium food ingredients business rather than the conglomerate discount that has weighed on Olam Group's stock.

In the meantime, ofi's underlying business delivers the promised high single-digit annual EBIT growth as cocoa and coffee price cycles normalize, the Ingredients & Solutions higher-margin segment continues growing, and the EUDR compliance moat converts into actual market share gains as less-invested competitors struggle.

The world Olam wins in is one where: commodity price cycles are moderate (not the extremes of 2023-2024), food premiumization continues, sustainability regulation drives volume toward traceable supply chains, and capital markets are receptive to London listings for food companies with genuine origin differentiation. In that world, ofi generates compounding earnings growth, and the eventual transaction value far exceeds what the market currently awards the combined holding company.

Base Case

The reorganization continues progressing but at an uneven pace. The Mindsprint sale completes. Some of the seven remaining OGH assets are divested; others prove harder to place than hoped, particularly the Gabon-based operations where regulatory complexity and ESG concerns narrow the buyer pool. ARISE P&L eventually closes. The Rusmolco asset in Russia remains effectively stranded until geopolitical conditions change. Olam Group carries a reduced but not eliminated corporate overhead through 2027.

ofi continues performing broadly as guided - with some years hitting high single-digit EBIT growth and others, like FY2025, delivering flat results when commodity cycles compress margins. The integrated supply chain model is resilient across cycles even if not dramatic. Customer relationships with Mars, Nestle, and other majors continue deepening.

The ofi IPO happens eventually - perhaps 2027 or 2028 - at a valuation that is decent but not exceptional, reflecting the messy road to listing and the lingering memory of volatile financial results during the cocoa crisis. The IPO or sale completes the reorganization that began in 2020 and investors who held through the full journey receive a cumulative return that is reasonable rather than spectacular.

Dividends remain low or zero while capital is directed toward balance sheet management and potential ofi standalone investments. The put option on the remaining Olam Agri stake provides a defined future capital return.

Bear Case

The ofi IPO does not happen in the medium term. London Stock Exchange appetite for mid-cap food ingredients companies remains thin, strategic buyers are unwilling to pay the multiple that would vindicate the reorganization, and ofi remains inside Olam Group indefinitely - an unlisted asset owned by an unlisted parent with declining dividends, uncertain strategy, and shrinking float.

Cocoa and coffee price volatility returns with another spike cycle - perhaps driven by a second consecutive El Nino affecting West Africa - creating another year of surging working capital, compressed margins, and balance sheet stress. ofi, which turned in a flat EBIT year in FY2025 under normalized conditions, reports a EBIT decline in a severe price year, calling the "high single-digit medium-term growth" narrative into question.

The remaining OGH assets prove deeply difficult to monetize. Rusmolco stays stranded. Olam Palm Gabon faces an ESG-motivated exit that destroys rather than creates value. The EUDR creates compliance costs that management underestimated, and a documentation gap in West African origins triggers an EU enforcement action that disrupts cocoa supply chains ahead of a major customer review.

The leadership transition from Verghese to Shekhar creates a period of uncertainty that erodes customer and banking relationships. A key counterparty - a major cocoa customer or a large creditor - uses the transition as an opportunity to renegotiate terms, introducing margin compression at exactly the wrong time.

In the bear case, Olam Group becomes a frustrating holding company - with a genuinely good business (ofi) trapped inside an expensive corporate structure, unable to execute the IPO that would unlock the value it has spent a decade building. Shareholders who anticipated a 2022 value crystallization in 2026 are still waiting.

Sources:

• Olam Group Investor Relations
• Olam Group H1 2025 Results Press Release
• Olam Group FY2024 Results Press Release
• Olam Group H1 2024 Results Press Release
• Olam Group FY2025 Results Press Release
• Olam FY2025 Q4 Earnings Call - Seeking Alpha
• Olam Group 2025 Annual Report
• ofi About Page
• ofi Cocoa Platform
• Olam Agri Products & Services
• Olam Group Dividend History
• Olam Group FY2025 Annual Report & Leadership Changes
• Olam Agri SALIC Sale Completion
• Olam Mindsprint Wipro Divestment
• Olam International Wikipedia
• MarketsandMarkets - Cocoa & Chocolate Market
• Precedence Research - Food Ingredients Market
• Bloomberg - Olam Leadership Overhaul
• Mars and ofi Regenerative Cocoa Programme